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The  EMS,  the  EMU,  and  the  Transition 
to a Common  Currency* 
1. Introduction 
Over the  past  decade,  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS) has  sur- 
prised most observers.  It has gone from a loose confederation of countries 
trying,  by  sometimes  almost  desperate  means,  to coordinate  exchange 
rates (and little else),  to a powerful  institution built on increasingly credi- 
ble, and apparently fixed parities. Its progress has created a momentum  of 
its own,  as planning  for the ambitious next step-the  creation of a mone- 
tary union  and common  currency-is  now  well underway.  The rush to- 
ward monetary  union  in Europe today is shared by both businesspeople 
and politicians.  (Although  economists  remain skeptical,  surveys  repeat- 
edly show  that the popularity  of the European 1992 program is dramati- 
cally strengthened  when  EMU is included.1) 
This  enthusiasm  has  made  the  question  of  the  day  how-not 
whether-to  accomplish  monetary  union.  One  widely  acknowledged 
concern  is  that  the  EMS may  be  extremely  vulnerable  to  speculative 
attacks during  the  transition  process,  which  is presently  envisioned  to 
require  several  years.  As  a way  of  avoiding  such  potential  turmoil,  a 
number  of authors  have  suggested  an acceleration  of the  timetable  for 
union.2 
In this paper, we  argue that speeding  up the process  will not by itself 
*This  paper was prepared  for NBER's  Macroeconomics  Annual  1991.  We thank  Lorenso  Bini 
Smaghi, Alberto  Giovannini,  Maurice  Obstfeld, Torsten  Persson, and Julio  Rotemberg  for 
helpful discussions, Rudi Dornbusch and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki  for comments, Yacine  Ait- 
Sahalia for excellent research assistance, and the MIT International  Financial  Services 
Research  Center  for generous research  support. 
1. See Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). 
2. See, for example, Commission of the European  Communities  (1990)  and Giovannini 
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make the transition stable. One problem is that once the date of currency 
union  is fixed,  national  central banks  will face a known,  finite horizon 
after  which  they  must  relinquish  the  possibility  of  an  independent 
exchange-rate  policy.  Consequently,  there is a danger  that their interest 
in  maintaining  a  long-term  antiinflationary  reputation  may  wane  as 
monetary  union  approaches.  A  related  problem  is  that their ability to 
improve  competitiveness  and  to  devalue  away  the  government's  debt 
becomes  especially  high  as currency union  approaches.  As long  as cur- 
rency unification  is perceived  to be far away, neither  of these  problems 
arises,  and the system  can remain quite stable. But this stability will not 
necessarily  translate into an easier transition.  Our analysis suggests  that 
intra-EMS interest-rate  differentials  might begin rising sharply as union 
draws closer. 
This theoretical  possibility  might not generate much concern if it were 
not  for mounting  evidence  of  strains  within  the  convergence  process. 
One of the most puzzling  features of the EMS performance to date is that 
member  countries  have  seemingly  pursued  very  different inflation  rate 
policies  while  allowing  for  only  relatively  small  adjustments  in  their 
exchange  rates.  The  Italian  lira,  for  example,  has  appreciated  in  real 
terms by almost  40% against  the  Deutsche  mark over the EMS period. 
Yet despite  substantial  current account deficits and a spiraling debt/GNP 
ratio,  the  Italian  government  has  not  been  forced  to  devalue  the  lira 
against  the  DM since  January 1987. At one  time,  it seemed  that Italian 
capital controls  might  explain  this phenomenon  but these  controls have 
now  been  dramatically reduced. 
Clearly, explaining  the behavior of real exchange  rates in the EMS is an 
important  step  toward  understanding  the dangers  that lie ahead for the 
transition.  Unfortunately,  as many  studies  in recent years have  shown, 
developing  an empirical model  of real exchange  rates is extremely  diffi- 
cult.3 Virtually  all recent  studies,  however,  concentrate  on  floating  ex- 
change  rates,  and  the  EMS experience  is more  akin to a crawling  peg. 
Here we  study intra-EMS real exchange  rates using a simple intertempo- 
ral maximizing  model  of  the  exchange  rates  and  current accounts,  in 
which  prices  are  fully  flexible.  Government  spending  affects  the  real 
exchange  rate because  it falls  more  heavily  on  nontraded  goods  than 
does private spending.  We use the model to show  that divergent govern- 
ment  spending  trajectories provide  a surprisingly  plausible  explanation 
of the apparent divergence  of EC real exchange  rates. The results for the 
Bretton Woods period  are similarly striking. 
We also  explore  alternative  explanations  for the  real exchange  rate 
3. See  for example,  Meese  and  Rogoff  (1988). See also  Marston (1987) and  Hsieh  (1982). Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  271 
anomaly,  including  productivity  disturbances  and improving  credibility 
of monetary  policy. Whereas  the evidence  supports  the hypothesis  that 
high productivity  growth  in the traded-goods  sector can provide  part of 
the explanation,  we argue that productivity  shocks alone cannot account 
for the large real exchange  rate gaps.  Furthermore, we argue that expla- 
nations  based  on improving  monetary  credibility are at odds  with  ever- 
increasing  real wage  gaps. 
Our overall assessment  of the situation is that the degree of monetary- 
policy  convergence  is  generally  overstated,  and  that  sharply  varying 
debt/GNP  ratios and real exchange  rates provide  a very strong tempta- 
tion  for  realignments  along  the  path  to  currency  union.  Indeed,  we 
argue that the temptation  is likely to be especially  strong near the time of 
union. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 explores  vari- 
ous indicators of convergence,  including  measures  of real exchange rates 
and  real  wages.  Section  3  contains  the  main  results  on  government 
spending  and real exchange  rates discussed  above.  Section 4 presents  a 
model  that illustrates  some  of the reputational  issues  that arise during 
the transition to monetary union.  Section 5 concludes.  In Appendix  1 we 
present  a description  of  the  EMS and  a brief assessment  of  the  argu- 
ments for currency union.  (Readers less familiar with the EMS may want 
to read Appendix  1 before proceeding  to the main text.) 
2. Convergence  within  the  EMS 
The  official  1989 Delors  report  advocates  the  creation  of  a  monetary 
union  only  after monetary  convergence  among  EMS countries  has been 
achieved.  During  "stage II" (which  is expected  to begin in 1992) member 
countries  are to achieve  further convergence  of monetary policies,  main- 
tain exchange  rates within even narrower bands, and develop  the institu- 
tional framework for a European Central Bank. More controversially, the 
EC is to develop  mechanisms  for achieving  greater coordination  of fiscal 
policy. Stage II is expected  to require 4 or 5 years to complete.  The hope 
of the Delors report is that this steady process of convergence  will culmi- 
nate in a seamless  transition to a common  currency. 
2.1 CONVERGENCE  IN INFLATION 
The result of arguments  for a gradual move  to a common  currency has 
been a heightened  concern with the convergence  process.  The degree to 
which convergence  has already been achieved  is most often summarized 
by the shrinking of inflation differentials.  At first glance, the progress has 
been impressive.  The top panel of Table 1 reports average annual rates of 272 - FROOT  & ROGOFF 
CPI inflation for several individual  countries (Germany, France, Italy, and 
the United States), the average across original members of the EMS (Ger- 
many, France, Italy, Denmark,  the Netherlands,  Belgium,  Luxembourg, 
and Ireland), and the average for non-EMS European countries (Norway, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Portugal,  Greece,  plus  recent  entrants  into  the 
exchange-rate  mechanism-Spain  and the United Kingdom). 
Table 1  INFLATION RATES IN THE EMS 
Non-EMS 
Germany  France  Italy  U. S.  EMS8a  Eurb 
1979  4.1  10.7  14.7  11.2  8.7  12.3 
1980  5.4  13.3  21.3  13.6  12.0  14.7 
1981  6.3  13.3  19.5  10.4  12.2  14.2 
1982  5.3  12.0  16.5  6.2  10.8  12.3 
1983  3.3  9.5  14.7  3.2  7.9  10.7 
1984  2.4  7.7  10.8  4.3  6.5  10.7 
1985  2.2  5.9  9.2  3.6  4.9  9.3 
1986  -0.1  2.5  5.9  1.9  2.5  7.7 
1987  0.2  3.3  4.7  3.7  2.3  6.7 
1988  1.3  2.7  5.1  4.1  2.5  6.4 
1989  2.8  3.5  6.3  4.8  3.7  7.5 
1990  2.7  3.4  6.6  5.2  3.7  8.2 
AVERAGE  ABSOLUTE  ANNUAL INFLATION  DIFFERENTIALS 
Non-EMS  EMS/ 
EMS8a  Eurb  Non-EMSC  Non-EMS  EMS/U.S. 
1979  5.3  9.3  8.5  3.6  2.5 
1980  7.4  7.6  6.9  2.7  1.6 
1981  7.0  6.9  6.6  2.0  1.9 
1982  5.7  7.8  7.7  1.5  4.6 
1983  5.0  9.6  9.4  2.8  4.7 
1984  3.5  10.5  9.8  4.2  2.2 
1985  2.8  7.5  7.3  4.3  1.3 
1986  2.6  8.4  8.1  5.2  0.6 
1987  2.5  5.7  5.3  4.4  1.4 
1988  2.0  4.4  4.1  3.8  1.5 
1989  2.0  4.7  4.4  3.8  1.2 
1990  1.6  4.9  4.6  4.5  1.5 
aEMS8  is comprised of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland,  and 
Luxembourg.  b Non-EMSEur  is comprised  of Greece, Norway, Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,  and United 
Kingdom.  c Non-EMS  is comprised  of Greece,  Norway, Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, Switzerland,  United  Kingdom, 
and United States. 
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The table helps  clarify two  points.  First, the disinflation  experienced 
by the EMS was shared by most countries,  regardless of their presence in 
the exchange-rate  mechanism.4  Nevertheless,  the EMS disinflation is the 
most  dramatic.  Second,  there  are still lingering  differences  in inflation 
rates across EMS nations.  The French-German  differential has fallen to 
an  almost  inconsequential  level-about  0.7%-whereas  the  Italian- 
German differential remains at almost 4%. 
The  bottom  panel  of  Table 1 attempts  to  measure  inflation  conver- 
gence  across the EMS more systematically,  by computing  average mean 
absolute  inflation  differentials  across groups  of countries.5 By this mea- 
sure,  there  has  been  an  impressive  degree  of  convergence  within  the 
original EMS8; the average  absolute  inflation  differential now  stands  at 
about  1.6%,  down  from  5.3% in  1979 and  7.4% in  1980.  Notice  that 
while  there  has  also  been  convergence  among  non-EMS  countries  in 
Europe  (which  are  denoted  as  "non-EMSEur" in  Table 1 and  which 
have witnessed  a fall in the mean absolute  inflation differential over the 
same  period  from  9.3  to  4.9%),  the  inflation  differential  between  the 
average  EMS country  and  average  non-EMS  country  has  not  shrunk. 
This  is  because  high-inflation  countries  such  as  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece,  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  experienced  no  more  disinfla- 
tion  on  average  than  have  the  original  Exchange-Rate-Mechanism 
(ERM) countries.  It is  hard  to  know  whether  this  pattern  will  persist 
with  the  recent  entry  of  relatively  high-inflation  countries  (Spain  and 
the United  Kingdom)  into the exchange-rate  mechanism.  Nevertheless, 
the  convergence  among  EMS countries  over  the  last decade  has  been 
uniquely  dramatic. 
2.2 REDUCTIONS  IN CAPITAL  CONTROLS 
Figure 1 uses  the differential between  on-shore  and euromarket 3-month 
deposit  rates to illustrate the extent of deregulation  of international capi- 
tal flows.  With  unrestricted  capital flows  the  rates should  be approxi- 
mately equalized; binding  controls on capital inflows  (outflows)  lead to a 
positive  (negative)  differential.  The  top  graph  shows  that those  coun- 
tries with  relatively  unrestricted  capital transactions-the  United  King- 
dom and Germany-exhibit  differentials  that are small in size,  and that 
were only slightly larger at the inception  of the EMS. For those countries 
with  controls  in place for much  of the period-France  and Italy-there 
4. A number  of authors  have  pursued  this point in greater detail.  See for example  Rogoff 
(1985), Giavazzi and Giovannini  (1989), Collins (1988), and Dornbusch  (1990). 
5. This column  is computed  by taking a simple average of the absolute value of all pairwise 
inflation differentials  in each period. 274 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
Figure  1 ONSHORE/OFFSHORE  DEPOSIT  RATE  DIFFERENTIAL  FOR  THE 
UNITED  KINGDOM  AND GERMANY  (a) AND FOR FRANCE  AND 
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has  been  a dramatic  reduction  in  deviations  from  onshore-offshore  par- 
ity, as  those  controls  were  lifted.6 
2.3 CONVERGENCE IN BUDGET DEFICITS 
Efforts  toward  convergence  have  not  been  limited  to  monetary  policy 
coordination.  The  fiscal  authorities  in  EMS  countries  with  budgetary 
problems  have  also  been  under  pressure  to  align  their  deficits.  Table  2 
shows  levels  of surpluses  and  primary  surpluses  as percentages  of coun- 
try GNP.7 Although  many  countries  ran  primary  deficits  throughout  the 
1980s,  currently  all countries,  except  Greece  and  the  Netherlands,  enjoy 
primary  surpluses  (bottom  panel,  Table  2).  This  effort  is  particularly 
noteworthy  for countries  with  historically  high  inflation-France,  Spain, 
Italy,  Portugal,  Ireland,  and  the  United  Kingdom-for  whom  the  cutting 
of  primary  deficits  represents  an  adjustment  to  the  loss  of  seigniorage 
revenues. 
These  improvements  are much  less  obvious  in the  top  panel  of Table 2, 
which  shows  straight  measures  of  budget  surpluses  as  percentages  of 
GNP.  Moreover,  as  Dornbusch  (1990)  notes,  once  the  surpluses  in Table 
2 are  cyclically  adjusted,  any  move  toward  convergence  becomes  even 
less  evident.  Italy,  for example,  has  witnessed  very  positive  growth  per- 
formance  in  the  last  several  years,  indicating  that  its  cyclically  adjusted 
deficit  has  worsened  over  time. 
2.4 CONVERGENCE IN PRICE AND  DEBT LEVELS 
The  evidence  on  price  and  debt  levels is  far less  suggestive  of  successful 
convergence  than  is  the  experience  with  inflation  and  financial  market 
deregulation.  Table  3 shows  cumulated  inflation  (measured  by  CPIs)  in 
several  EMS  countries  relative  to  Germany,  and  compares  it  with  each 
6. See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986). To many observers, the successful removal of 
capital  controls  is a clear  manifestation  of the improved  stability  of the EMS.  It is evident 
from  Figure  1 that throughout  the early  1980s,  capital  controls  permitted  the French  and 
Italian governments to finance their debts at substantially  lower rates than an open 
international  capital market  would have demanded. Perhaps  at that time, the system 
could not have survived without these controls:  if the French  and Italian  governments 
were forced to pay the higher off-shore  rates, they might have found it too costly not  to 
devalue. Presumably,  the market  would have known this, and would have charged  even 
higher  interest  rates  than those actually  observed  in the off-shore  market.  In other  words, 
with such low levels of credibility,  there simply may not have been an equilibrium 
intermediate  between a pure float (or  crawling  peg) and irrevocably  fixed  parities.  In this 
sense, capital  controls  may have been a critical  ingredient  in the evolution of the EMS, 
seeing it through  its early,  unpredictable  adolescence. 
7. Primary  surpluses are computed by subtracting  an estimate of interest payments (the 
short-term  interest  rate times the stock of outstanding  government  debt) to receipts  less 
expenditures.  This estimate  is likely to be too high, primarily  because  gross government 
debt is often less than net debt. Table 2  BUDGET SURPLUSES IN THE EMS AS A PERCENT OF GNP 
Belgium  Denmark  Germany  Greece  Spain  France  Ireland  Italy  Luxbg  Nthlds  Prtgl  U.K. 
Av.  79-82  -10.1  -5.3  -3.1  -9.4  -3.4  -1.4  -12.8  -9.9  -0.9  -5.1  -9.9  -3.0 
Av.  83-86  -9.5  -2.5  -1.7  -11.2  -5.9  -2.9  -11.0  -11.6  3.5  -5.9  -9.6  -3.1 
Av.  87-90  -6.5  0.2  -1.8  -16.2.  -3.1  -1.6  -5.3  -10.6  2.5  -5.6  -5.5  0.1 
PRIMARY BUDGET SURPLUSES AS A PERCENT OF GNP 
Belgium  Denmark  Germany  Greece  Spain  France  Ireland  Italy  Luxbg  Nthlds  Prtgl  U.K. 
Av.  79-82  1.2  1.0  -0.0  -2.9  0.2  1.9  0.4  1.0  0.4  -0.1  1.8  5.4 
Av. 83-86  1.6  5.3  0.6  -1.9  0.1  0.3  2.1  0.6  4.9  -2.0  2.6  3.3 
Av. 87-90  3.9  6.3  0.8  -2.9  3.6  1.6  5.8  0.8  3.3  -0.6  3.9  5.8 
Notes:  Budget  surpluses are from the Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990).  Primary  surpluses are computed from  simple surpluses by adding 
interest  payments on outstanding debt to the surpluses. Interest  payments are computed  by multiplying  short-term  interest rates times the government- 
debt/GNP  ratio  (these data also from  the Commission  of the European  Communities). Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  277 
Table 3  CUMULATED CHANGES IN CPIs AND  NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATES AGAINST THE DM 
Logarithmic  percent  changes  in 
CPI  Exchange  rate  CPI  Exchange  rate 
1979-1986  1979-1986  1987-1990  1987-1990 
Netherlands  2  4  -3  0 
Belgium  18  22  2  0 
Luxembourg  16  22  1  0 
Denmark  34  23  8  0 
France  41  27  4  0 
Italy  74  31  15  0 
Ireland  55  25  6  0 
Sources:  Commission  of the European Communities  (1990) and IMF. 
currency's  nominal  exchange  rate change  against  the  DM.8 Denmark, 
France,  and  (especially)  Italy and  Ireland  have  experienced  large  real 
appreciations,  whereas  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  and  Luxembourg 
have recently more or less anchored their price levels to that of Germany. 
The table also  shows  that since  the last realignment  against  the DM of 
January 1987,  Italy  has  experienced  a  substantial  real appreciation  of 
about 16%. 
A  more  comprehensive  picture  of  relative  price  movements  can be 
gained from Figures 2a-d,  which  show  real exchange  rate movements  of 
EMS currencies  against  an  ECU-weighted  basket  of  consumer  prices. 
The graphs  reveal  three  general  types  of country  experience:  Belgium, 
the Netherlands,  Denmark,  and France have all succeeded  in stabilizing 
their real ECU exchange  rates in parallel with  that of Germany; Ireland 
has cut its inflation rate to the point where it has achieved  a real deprecia- 
tion of the  pound  against  the  ECU countries;  and  Italy, Spain,  and the 
United  Kingdom  have  appreciated  substantially  in  real  terms.  While 
Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  only  recently  joined  the  ERM 
(Spain in June 1989, and the United Kingdom in October 1990), their real 
exchange  rates along  with  Italy's currently appear both appreciated and 
appreciating.  Indeed,  during its brief participation in the ERM, the Span- 
ish peseta  has  already appreciated  over 10% in real terms (using  CPIs). 
However,  although  inflation  rates are converging,  divergences  in con- 
sumer price levels are continuing  to grow. Even though  countries such as 
Italy, Spain,  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  attenuated  their  inflation 
differentials  with  Germany,  all  three  differentials  remain  positive  at 
about 3.5,  2.5,  and 3% per annum,  respectively.  In fact, as can be seen 
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from Table 1, the Italian-German  inflation differential has not fallen over 
the  last 3 years.  If these  cumulated  price differentials  are to be  erased 
before monetary  union  without  further realignments,  Italy will have  to 
run a substantially  lower rate of inflation  than Germany for a sustained 
period. 
Current account  deficits  are another  measure  that might  reveal  evi- 
dence of important recent divergences.  Table 4 shows  deficits as percent- 
ages  of  GNP.  Those  countries  with  growing  price-level  gaps  are also 
experiencing  deteriorating  current accounts.  Spain and Italy have  seen 
their  current  accounts  fall by  5.5  and  1.8% of  their  respective  GNPs 
between  1986 and  1990. Portugal,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Germany 
have also had their current surpluses  shrink (the latter apparently associ- 
ated with German unification,  since the deterioration begins suddenly  in 
the second  quarter of 1990). 
3. Explaining  the  Real  Exchange  Rate  Puzzle 
As  is well  known,  the  growing  divergences  in price levels  and current 
accounts  could  be  due  to  several  factors,  not  all of  which  require  an 
ultimate  downward  readjustment  in the level  of the real exchange  rate. 
In what  follows  we  consider  three  likely  kinds  of  sources  that  could 
account,  at least  in  principle,  for intra-EMS real exchange  rate move- 
ments:  shocks  to government  spending  or deficits,  shocks to productiv- 
ity, and imperfectly  credible aggregate  demand  policy. 
3.1 SHOCKS  TO GOVERNMENT  SPENDING 
To understand  the intra- and intertemporal effects of government  spend- 
ing on real exchange  rates and current accounts,  it is useful to think of a 
simple Ricardian neoclassical  model of a small country that produces two 
goods  in fixed supply.9 (For a technical discussion,  see Appendix  2.) One 
9. In thinking about how fiscal policies affect the exchange rate and current  account, it 
might seem most natural to begin with the classic Mundell-Fleming model. Under 
floating  exchange rates, and with a high degree of capital  mobility,  that model predicts 
that increases  in government  spending or decreases  in taxes  lead to a real  exchange  rate 
appreciation  and a current  account  deficit. 
For  our  present  purposes, however,  the logic  behind  this  result  is unsatisfactory  for  two 
reasons. First,  in that model nominal  goods prices  are  fixed, so an increase  in the price  of 
domestic goods relative to the domestic price of foreign goods can be achieved only 
through  an appreciation  of the nominal  exchange  rate.  The sticky-price  assumption  may 
not be very realistic  here, since in practice  any sluggishness in the response of prices  is 
likely to be matched  (at the very least) by sluggishness in the state of fiscal  policy.  More- 
over, within the EMS  it is clear that exchange rates do not float;  as Table  3 suggests, 
nominal  prices  across  EMS  countries  seem more  flexible  over time  than  do the associated 
exchange  rates.  A second problem  with this Mundell-Fleming  model  is that  it ignores  the 
intertemporal  dimension of current  account  and government  budget imbalances. Table 4  CURRENT ACCOUNT  SURPLUSES IN THE EMS AS A PERCENT OF GNP 
Belgium  Denmark  Germany  Greece  Spain  France  Ireland  Italy  Nthlds  Prtgl  U.K. 
1979  -2.9  -4.7  -0.8 
1980  -4.3  -327  -1.7 
1981  -3.8  -3.0  -0.7 
1982  -3.7  -4.2  0.5 
1983  -0.8  -2.6  0.7 
1984  -0.6  -3.3  1.3 
1985  0.3  -4.6  2.6 
1986  2.0  -5.5  4.4 
1987  1.2  -3.0  4.1 
1988  1.0  -1.8  4.1 
1989  1.0  -1.3  4.7 
1990  0.3  0.0  2.6 
Source:  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). 
-1.9  0.5  0.9  -13.4  1.6  -1.2  -1.7  -0.1 
0.5  -2.5  -0.6  -11.8  -2.2  -1.5  -5.9  1.5 
-0.7  -2.7  -0.8  -14.7  -2.2  2.2  -12.2  2.4 
-4.4  -2.5  -2.1  -10.6  -1.6  3.2  -13.5  1.4 
-5.0  -1.5  -0.8  -6.9  0.3  3.1  -8.3  0.9 
-4.0  1.5  0.0  -5.8  -0.6  4.2  -3.4  -0.2 
-8.2  1.6  0.1  -4.0  -0.9  4.1  0.4  0.6 
-5.3  1.7  0.5  -2.9  0.5  2.7  2.4  -0.8 
-3.1  0.1  -0.3  1.3  -0.2  1.4  -0.4  -1.9 
-1.7  -1.1  -0.4  1.8  -0.6  2.4  -4.4  -4.1 
-4.8  -2.9  -0.2  1.6  -1.3  3.6  -1.2  -3.7 
-5.1  -3.8  -0.3  1.2  -1.3  3.3  -1.2  -2.8 282 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
is a traded international  good, the demand for which is perfectly  elastic, 
so its price can be taken as given. The other is a domestic good (which 
may or may not be traded), the demand for which is inelastic. The price 
of the domestic good is fully flexible  and determined  by market  clearing. 
Consider first the  simplest case-an  unanticipated, permanent in- 
crease  in government consumption expenditure  that falls relatively  more 
on domestic goods than does private expenditure. This permanently  re- 
duces the supply of domestic goods available  to the foreign  and domestic 
private  sectors.10  (If there is perfect  factor  mobility,  then there is no effect 
on the real exchange rate;  if there is slow intersectoral  factor  adjustment, 
then there is no long-run  effect on the real exchange rate, see Froot  and 
Rogoff, 1991.)  Thus the real exchange rate-the  price  of domestic  relative 
to international  goods-appreciates  permanently.  There is no effect on 
the current  account.11 
For  temporary  changes in government  consumption,  real  exchange  rate 
and current  account behavior are somewhat more complex. Here it suf- 
fices to note that an unanticipated  but temporary  increase  in government 
consumption unambiguously appreciates  the real exchange rate for the 
same reasons as discussed above. However, the impact effect on the 
current  account is ambiguous, as the change in domestic consumption 
depends on the elasticities of both intra-  and intertemporal  substitution. 
And since the direction of change in the current  account determines the 
change in the country's long-run indebtedness, temporary  changes in 
government spending also must have an ambiguous effect on the long- 
run trade balance and real exchange rate. 
3.1.1 Evidence  on the Real-Exchange-Rate/Fiscal-Policy  Relation As is often 
the case when it comes to the real exchange rate, we are enriched by 
the apparent insights from these models, but impoverished by their 
lack of empirical confirmation. There is very little empirical evidence 
that any known fundamentals-let  alone government consumption in 
particular-have  reliable effects on the real exchange rate. Much of the 
existing empirical work, however, has centered on the major floating 
exchange rates.12  Perhaps the much lower volatility of intra-EMS  real 
10. We are implicitly  assuming that both goods are normal. 
11. The real-exchange-rate  result is likely to be quite robust. In some instances, govern- 
ment consumption can be thought of as absorbing  some of the available  supply of 
certain  goods. In other cases, government  consumption  draws factors  away from  their 
alternative  uses in production.  Since government  consumption  is labor  intensive (pay- 
ing bureaucrats,  educators, medical practitioners,  and military  personnel) the reduc- 
tion in private  labor  supply can be expected to have a disproportionately  large  negative 
effect on the production  of domestic goods, which are typically  more labor  intensive 
than international  goods. 
12. See Meese and Rogoff  (1983). Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  283 
exchange  rates can help  reveal  an empirical  relationship  between  gov- 
ernment  consumption  and the real exchange  rate that cannot be identi- 
fied when  nominal  exchange  rates float. 
Table 5 shows  the  results  of regressions  of the real exchange  rate on 
the current levels  of both domestic  and foreign government  spending  as 
a fraction of GNP: 
rt =  a  +  3lgt  +  23gt  +  Et  (1) 
where  rt is the time-t real exchange  rate measured  using  the CPIs for the 
EMS8 and using  GNP weights,  gt is domestic  government  consumption 
expenditures  divided  by domestic  GNP, and gt is a GNP-weighted  aver- 
age  of  foreign  (other-EMS)  government  consumption  expenditure  di- 
vided  by foreign  GNP. In Appendix  2, we  show  that the specification  in 
(1)  comes  directly  out  of  a  simple  neoclassical  model,  with  Cobb- 
Douglas  intratemporal  preferences  and  an  intertemporal  elasticity  of 
substitution  of one.13 To attribute the coefficients  ,8 and p2  in the regres- 
sion  model  (1) directly  to  the  effects  of  fiscal policy,  it is necessary  to 
assume  that the shares of government  spending  are exogenous,  and that 
they  are uncorrelated  with  other  exogenous  determinants  of  the  real 
exchange  rate, such as monetary  policy on productivity. 
Table 5 presents  three  groups  of OLS estimates:  in the top panel  are 
estimates from the cross section,  time-series panel of 11 years and 8 coun- 
tries; in the middle panel are cross-sectional  estimates,  one for each of the 
11 years in the sample; and in the bottom panel are time-series  estimates 
for the 8 individual  countries.  The residuals in the regressions  with time- 
series components  are highly serially correlated (note the Durbin-Watson 
statistics).14 As  a result,  we  have  allowed  for arbitrary serial correlation 
using the Newey  and West (1987) covariance-matrix estimator.15 Neverthe- 
less,  with  so few  time-series  observations,  one  should  be careful when 
drawing inferences  from any single  time-series  coefficient. 
With these  caveats in mind,  note that the estimates  of 8/ in Table 5 are 
consistently  positive,  and those  for P2  are consistently  negative.  Indeed, 
in  the  top  panel  of  the  table  (which  pools  the  time  series  and  cross 
section),  the estimates  of /3 and /2  are of almost equal magnitude;  they 
13. Table  5 uses annual data from 1979  to 1989.  In some of the estimates,  we constrain 3,  = 
-32  in order  to conserve on degrees of freedom  and to limit  multicollinearity. 
14. The reported  Durbin-Watson  statistics  are  cross-sectional  averages  of the country  time- 
series Durbin-Watson  statistics. 
15. In all of the regressions that follow, we tried this covariance  matrix  estimator  and its 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted  counterpart  in addition to the standard OLS covariance 
matrix. In all cases we have taken the most conservative  approach  by selecting the 
largest  of standard  errors  estimated  across these various  techniques. Table 5  REGRESSIONS OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES ON GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION/GNP  AND  BUDGET 
SURPLUSES/GNP,  FOR  EMS  COUNTRIES,  1979-1989 
rt  =  a + 131gt  + 1329*  +  YlSt  +  Y2S*  +  'Et 
SE  12  SE  SE  SE  R2  DW  DF 
1. In levels 
2. In levels 
3. In levels 
4. In levels 
5. In changes 
6. In changes 
7. In changes 
8. In changes 






2.103t  0.735  - 3.618t  1.959  0.14  0.81  82 
2.109t  0.791  -2.109t  0.791  0.13  0.79  83 
3.481t  0.860  -3.090  3.595  0. 786t  0.333  -0.250  1.393  0.21  0.88  80 
3.496t  0.850  -3.496t  0.850  0. 777t  0.330  -0.  777t  0.330  0.21  0.88  82 
0.361  0.626  -0.108  1.248  0.01  1.59  74 
0.375  0.622  -0.375  0.622  0.01  1.60  75 
0.471  0.774  -0.289  1.929  0.037  0.209  -0.187  0.664  0.01  1.58  72 
0.455  0.762  -0.455  0.762  0.037  0.204  -0.037  0.204  0.01  1.60  74 
Cross-sectional  regression  with  annual  dummies,  1 =  -f82 
6.176t  1.854 
1.389  1.888 
1.148  2.427 
0.728  2.694 
-1.568  4.432 
0.823  4.329 
0.23  63 3.063  3.430  -3.063  3.430 
1.151  2.286  -1.151  2.286 
2.468  3.817  -2.468  3.817 
2.353  2.074  -2.353  2.074 
2.834t  1.562  -2.834t  1.562 








Time series  regressions  by country,  /1  =  -/2 
4.117t  1.373  -4.117t  1.373 
0.967  0.781  -0.967  0.781 
-3.993t  1.819  3.993t  1.819 
3.218  2.209  -3.218  2.209 
-1.058  2.100  1.058  2.100 
7.111  1.137  -7.111  1.137 
7.137t  2.036  -7.137t  2.036 
2.278t  0.526  -2.278t  0.526 
Notes: tStatistical significance  at the 10% level.  rt is an index  of the intra-EMS real exchange  rate (expressed  as the price of a domestic  CPI basket relative  to the 
price of a GNP-weighted  basket  of other  EMS countries'  CPI). gt is the ratio of government  consumption  to GNP; gt  is the GNP-weighted  average  of other 
EMS countries'  gts. st and st are comparable  ratios of government  budget  surpluses  to GNP.  All variables  have  country-specific  means  removed.  The  cross- 
sectional  regression  is run using  dummy  intercept  and  slope-interaction  terms for individual  years. 






0.50  0.47 
0.14  0.73 
0.63  1.01 
0.19  1.36 
0.03  0.42 
0.81  0.95 
0.67  1.45 
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say  that  an  increase  (decrease)  in  domestic  (foreign)  government  con- 
sumption  of 1% of domestic  (foreign)  GNP yields  a real appreciation  of 
about 2%. The adjusted  standard errors suggest  that these estimates  are 
reliably positive.16 
In the  third and  fourth  lines  of the  top panel,  we  add  domestic  and 
foreign  government  budget  surpluses  (from Table 2 above)  as percent- 
ages of GNP to regression  (1): 
rt  =  t  +  pgt  +  2t  +  YSt  +  2St +  Et.  (2) 
This regression  is more  difficult  to interpret  than is (1) as st and  s* are 
much less likely to be exogenous.  Nevertheless,  if Ricardian equivalence 
fails, we  might  expect  that an increase  in the surplus  (holding  constant 
government  spending)  leads  to an decrease  in total expenditure.  With a 
fixed supply  of domestic  goods,  the real exchange  rate must depreciate. 
In other words,  we might  expect  y, <  0 and  y2  >  0. 
The data show  no evidence  of this effect, however.  The coefficients  on 
the surplus measures are not statistically different from zero, and are even 
of the wrong  signs.  The coefficients  on foreign and domestic government 
consumption  become  larger and even  more statistically significant when 
surpluses  are included.  But the serial correlation in the residuals remains 
quite severe. 
One  way  of mitigating  the serial correlation problem  in these  regres- 
sions  is  to  run  them  in  changes  rather than  in levels.  A  potential  ob- 
jection  to  such  a regression  is  its  low  power:  If there  is  independent 
measurement  error in the regressors,  it may become  accentuated  when 
the  regression  is  run  in  changes.17 In this  case  we  would  expect  the 
coefficients  to be smaller when  estimated  in changes  rather than in lev- 
els. In lines 5 through  8 of the top panel of Table 5, we run Equations (1) 
and  (2) in changes.  The coefficients  are indeed  much  smaller and  lose 
their statistical significance,  but nevertheless  retain their expected  signs; 
16. We tried several other versions  of these regressions,  not reported here to save space. A 
time trend was  included  on the right-hand  side of (1), but was found  to be statistically 
insignificant.  We also tried reversing that regression,  by running government  spending 
on  the  real exchange  rate and  a  time  trend,  but  again  found  the  time  trend  to  be 
insignificant  and  the  positive  covariance  between  the real exchange  rate and govern- 
ment spending  to be statistically significant. 
17. Suppose  that measured  government  consumption  is the sum of true consumption,  g't 
=  gt'  g  +  Et. Suppose  also that g', + follows  an AR (1) process: g't = Sg',t-  +  t, where 
0 <  8 <  1 and ut is iid. Under these  assumptions  it is easy to show  that the downward 
bias in ,8  is greater for the regression  in changes  than for the regression  in levels. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  287 
the Durbin-Watson  tests  show  very little remaining  serial correlation in 
the residuals. 
In the middle  panel of the table we use cross-sectional  regressions  as a 
second  means  of alleviating  the serial correlation problem.18 Like the re- 
gressions  in changes  above,  this method  suffers from low power.  How- 
ever,  it gives  us  another  check  on  the  correct magnitude  of the  coeffi- 
cients,  since  the expected  decline  in power  comes  from increased  stan- 
dard errors and not decreased  coefficient estimates.  Of the 11 estimates of 
p3  from this method,  only two are statistically different from zero, but both 
are positive.  Moreover,  10 of the 11 estimates  are greater than zero, with 
an average estimate  of 2.2-very  close to that for the data set as a whole. 
Finally, in the  bottom  panel  we  present  the  estimates  from the indi- 
vidual  country  time-series  regressions.  Of these,  7 of  8 coefficient  es- 
timates  are positive.  Of the  4 that are statistically  different  from zero, 
all  are  positive  as  well.  Interestingly,  the  Italian  real  exchange  rate 
appears  among  the  most  sensitive  to  changes  in  relative  government 
expenditure.19 
The evidence  in Table 5 is admittedly  sketchy-the  EMS experience 
involves  a limited  number  of  countries  over  a limited  period  of  time. 
However,  as  we  show  in Froot and  Rogoff  (1991), a strikingly  similar 
relationship  between  the  real exchange  rate and government  spending 
occurs during the Bretton Woods period (1950-1973) for a broader group 
of 17 countries.  The coefficients  on government  spending  (which for the 
combined  cross  section  time-series  regressions  are roughly  the  same 
order of magnitude  as the EMS period estimates)  are even  more statisti- 
cally significant  in this larger data set. Moreover, they remain significant 
in the  first-difference  regressions.  Interestingly,  however,  this relation- 
ship appears to weaken  during floating-rate periods  (1973-1989 for non- 
EMS countries,  and  1973-1979  for  the  broader  group  of  countries). 
Taken together,  these  results  suggest  a fairly reliable relation between 
government  spending  and the real exchange  rate (see Froot and Rogoff, 
1991, for more  detail).  At the  same  time,  they  provide  no positive  evi- 
18. In these  regressions,  both  the  regressors  and  regressands  are demeaned  by country. 
This allows  for country-specific  fixed effects.  To save space and to conserve  on degrees 
of freedom,  we  report only estimates  from (1), under the constraint that 3  =  -/32.  The 
omitted  estimates  of  (1) and  (2) are not  qualitatively  different  from the  other  results 
reported in Table 5. 
19. We also  estimated  (1) and  (2) using  total  government  expenditure,  which  includes 
government  investment  and  transfer payments,  in addition  to consumption  expendi- 
ture. If transfer payments  divert labor resources away from production,  they will drive 
up the price of domestic  goods  provided  that the production  of those goods  is relatively 
labor  intensive.  The  estimates  from  these  regressions,  not  reported  here,  are  very 
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dence  that  deficits  or taxes  themselves  have  important  effects  on  real 
exchange  rates. 
3.1.2  Implied  Impact  of Government  Spending  on Real Exchange  Rates  What 
do  our  estimates  suggest  about  the  magnitude  of  real  exchange  rate 
changes  within  the  EMS induced  by government  expenditure?  Table 6 
shows  in the  first column  the change  in gt  -  gt  from 1979 to 1989 as a 
percent of GNP. Within the EMS8, Italy has had the largest growth in its 
relative  fiscal position,  which  has  increased  by 2.9%. At  the  other  ex- 
treme, Belgium,  Ireland, and the Netherlands  have succeeded  in cutting 
substantially  their relative shares of government  spending. 
The second  column  of Table 6 reports the estimated  real exchange  rate 
appreciation caused by the divergences  in government  consumption,  us- 
ing a coefficient  from (1) of /=  =  -I2  = 2.1. Italy has the largest implied 
appreciation within the EMS8 of almost 9%. This measure is probably con- 
servative; if we were to use Italy's individual  coefficient from the bottom 
panel of Table 5 of 7.1, the implied  appreciation would  instead be 29.1%. 
If government  spending  patterns  can  indeed  help  explain  real  ex- 
change rates within  the EMS, the question  becomes  whether  there is any 
reason to believe  that recent budgetary  trends will have to be reversed.  It 
is  clear  from  our  model  above  that  as  long  as  the  two  intertemporal 
budget  constraints-those  for the  fiscal authority  and  the country  as a 
whole-are  satisfied,  any increase in government  consumption  expendi- 
ture,  and  the  associated  change  in the  real exchange  rate,  can be  sus- 
tained. The next three columns  of Table 6 help shed light on the potential 
Table  6  CHANGES  IN RELATIVE  POSITION  OF GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION  AND CURRENT  ACCOUNTS  1979-1989, 
PERCENT  OF GNP 
Implied  % 
change  in  Change  in 
Change  in  real  exchange  Change  in  intra-EEC 
government  rate  Change  in  current  trade 
consumption (relative  to DM)  debt  account  balance 
Belgium  -2.9  -3.7  57.5  3.2  0.1 
Denmark  0.5  3.5  35.2  4.7  4.1 
France  1.2  5.0  12.2  -1.2  -1.3 
Germany  -1.2  0.0  13.8  3.4  1.8 
Ireland  -2.5  -2.8  28.7  14.6  19.9 
Italy  2.9  8.6  40.2  -2.9  -1.4 
Netherlands  -2.8  -3.4  33.6  4.5  3.5 
Sources:  Commission  of the European Communities  (1990), IMF, and authors' calculations. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  289 
permanence  of changes  in government  consumption  by examining  the 
behavior of government  and external debt relative to GNP. 
The third column  of Table 6 shows  changes  in government  debt/GNP 
ratios; columns  four  and  five  try to  assess  the  external  constraint  by 
looking  at changes  in the current account and intra-EEC trade balance.20 
It is clear from these  measures  that Italy (which  has the largest implied 
exchange  rate  appreciation  within  the  EMS8) also  has  had  a large in- 
crease in its government  debt ratio and a substantial  deterioration of its 
external accounts.21 Of course,  an increase  in Italian taxes could correct 
the explosive  trend in the domestic  debt burden.  But if the added  taxes 
are distortionary, and the government  attempts  to smooth  across distor- 
tions,  any  fiscal adjustment  program  is likely  to combine  decreases  in 
government  expenditure  with increases  in taxes. 
The  evidence  on  the  current  accounts  also  provides  support  for 
the  notion  that  the  changes  in  government  spending  are likely  to be 
temporary.  Recall  from  our  model  above  that  permanent  changes  in 
government  consumption  have  little  effect  on  the  current  account, 
whereas  temporary  increases  in  spending  generally  lead  to  current 
account  deficits.  It is  true  that  in  the  non-Ricardian-equivalence  ver- 
sion  of the model,  an increase  in taxes  (without  any change  in govern- 
ment  consumption)  can reduce  current private expenditure  on domes- 
tic goods,  thereby  permitting  an  improvement  in  the  current account 
and  a  depreciation  in  the  real  exchange  rate.  However,  this  mecha- 
nism  appears  empirically  unimportant:  the  regression  results  above 
show  no  evidence  of  an  effect  of  deficits  (controlling  for government 
expenditure)  on  the  price of domestic  goods.  This reasoning  therefore 
suggests  both  that  the  real  appreciation  in  column  two  of  Table  6 
is  temporary,  and  that  adjustment  will  require  cuts  in  government 
consumption.22 
3.2 SHOCKS  TO PRODUCTIVITY 
A  second,  complementary  explanation  of  the  divergences  in  real  ex- 
change  rates within  the EMS is that of productivity  shocks. 
The  usual  story  linking  productivity  shocks  with  the  real exchange 
20. Whereas  the current  account  is the correct  gauge of debt accumulation,  our emphasis  is 
on alignment within the EMS. For this reason, the intra-EEC  trade balance is also 
reported. 
21. Only Belgium  had a larger  increase  in its government  debt ratio  during  this period. But 
over the last 4 years, Belgium has been working down its debt, whereas Italy's  ratio 
continues to grow. See also Table  11. 
22. The EEC-1992  program  is itself likely to force  down the price  of Italian  domestic  goods 
(and factors)  through increased  economic integration  and factor  mobility,  even if gov- 
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rate, which  is due  to Balassa (1964) and Samuelson  (1964), can again be 
illustrated within  the basic model  of Appendix  2. Each country produces 
two  goods,  international  and domestic,  with  labor mobile between  sec- 
tors (capital is assumed  to be a fixed factor) but with  total labor in fixed 
supply. International goods  are traded, and compete  directly with goods 
from other  countries.  They  also  have  more  rapid productivity  growth 
than  do  domestic  goods.  Under  these  assumptions  if  productivity 
growth  in the  international-goods  sector exceeds  that of the  domestic- 
goods  sector,  the  price of  domestic  goods  rises  relative  to the  price of 
international  goods.23 
The  prima  facie  case  for the  Balassa-Samuelson  explanation  seems 
reasonable  enough.  Table 7 compares  the  1979-1989  real exchange  rate 
appreciation  within  the EMS8 against average annual real growth rates. 
Those countries  which  experienced  the largest real appreciations against 
the  DM  (Ireland and  Italy) have  indeed  enjoyed  relatively  more  rapid 
real growth.24 A devotee  of this view  might even interpret the regression 
results in the previous  subsection  as confirmatory evidence,  arguing that 
changes  in  the  ratio  of  government  consumption  to  GNP  are highly 
positively  correlated with  productivity  shocks.25 
We explored  this possibility  further in two ways.  First, we ran a set of 
regressions  comparable to those  presented  in Table 5, but including  time 
trends  as additional  regressors  in an effort to pick up  country-specific 
differences  in  rates  of  productivity  growth.  The  reported  coefficients 
were  qualitatively  unaffected  by  the  added  time  trends.  In  addition, 
almost all of the coefficients  on the trend term were insignificant. 
Second,  since productivity  growth  differences  during our sample may 
not be well approximated  by constants  (which is what is captured in the 
time-trend  terms  mentioned  above),  we  obtained  direct  estimates  of 
productivity  for use  as  additional  regressors  alongside  of  government 
spending.  Conceptually,  the model  calls for measures  of total factor pro- 
ductivity in all countries  for both the domestic  and international sectors. 
We show  in Appendix  2 that in the presence  of permanent  and unantici- 
23. See Appendix 2 for a formal  derivation. 
24. In the third column of Table  7, we report real appreciation  using nominal unit labor 
costs rather than consumer prices (which are used in the first column). The fastest 
growing countries-Ireland  and Italy-have  experienced  large real appreciations  as 
measured  by unit labor  costs as well. It is interesting  to note, however, that since the 
last realignment  in January  1987, Ireland  has grown almost 2%  per year more rapidly 
than has Italy,  yet Italian  unit labor  costs have risen much more rapidly.  (See the last 
column of Table  7.) 
25. Note that the regressions in Table  5 are based on the ratio of nominal government 
spending to nominal GNP. In the model of Appendix 2, an unanticipated  permanent 
traded-goods  productivity  shock has no effect on this ratio;  an anticipated  (or partly 
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Table  7  LOGARITHMIC  PERCENT  CHANGES  IN RELATIVE  PRICES  AND 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH 
Change  in NUL  Change  in NUL 
Change in  Change in  adjusted  for  since last 
CPI real  real GNP  exchange-rate  exchange  rate 
exchange  rate  (relative  to  realignments  realignment 
(relative to DM)  Germany)  (relative  to DM)  (relative  to DM) 
(1979-1989)  (1979-1989)  (1979-1989)  (1987-1990) 
Belgium  -5.7  -1.1  -5.1  2.2 
Denmark  10.9  -6.0  10.6  4.5 
France  6.1  -0.9  6.0  4.0 
Ireland  24.2  9.7  20.4  -4.1 
Italy  31.9  6.0  34.5  15.4 
Netherlands  -0.4  -4.9  -0.3  -3.0 
Note:  NUL, nominal  unit labor  costs. 
Sources:  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990),  IMF,  and authors'  calculations. 
pated  productivity  shocks  in these  sectors  (holding  government  spend- 
ing constant),  the percentage  change  in the domestic  CPI is given by 
dpcpI,t =  daTt -  dyt  (3) 
where  dpcp  ,t is the percentage  change  in the CPI, daTt  is the percentage 
change  in relative  (domestic  less  foreign) total factor productivity  in the 
international-goods  sector, and dyt is the percentage  change in total out- 
put (i.e.,  a share-weighted  average of output growth in the international 
and domestic  sectors). 
To  measure these productivity changes we employ data on labor produc- 
tivity for both  the  manufacturing  sector and the entire economy.  (Note 
that  with  Hicks-neutral  growth,  labor  and  total-factor  productivity 
growth rates are equal in any given  sector.) In using  these measures,  we 
are therefore implicitly assuming  that output from the manufacturing sec- 
tor is traded, and (therefore) that its price is determined  internationally.26 
The series for labor productivity  in manufacturing  output  are computed 
by taking the ratio of an index of manufacturing  output to manufacturing 
employment  (both from OECD Main Economic Indicators); to measure 
economywide  labor productivity  we used  the ratio of real GNP (from the 
IMF) to civilian  employment  (from OECD Main Economic  Indicators). 
Table 8 presents  the results of the regression: 
rt =  a  +  gt-  gt)  +  (zt  -  zt)  +  82(Z, -  Zt)  +  Et,  (4) 
26. To the  extent  that some  manufacturing  output  falls into  the  class  of domestic  goods 
(i.e.,  if its price is at least partially determined  by domestic  supply  and demand),  our 
measure  of daTt -  dy will be biased  toward zero. Table 8  REGRESSIONS OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES ON  GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION/GNP  AND 
PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS, FOR EMS COUNTRIES, 1979-1989 
rt =  a  +  3(gt -  g8)  + 81(zt  -  z4) +  62(Zt  -  Zt)  +  et 
13  SE  81  SE  82  SE  R2  DW  DF 
1. In levels 
2. In levels 
3. In levels 










2.357t  0.631 
1.677t  0.758  -0.053 
1.694t  0.754  -0.091 
0.18  0.65  83 
0.044  0.14  0.69  77 
0.049  0.077t  0.038  0.19  0.65  73 
Cross-sectional  regression  with  annual  dummies,  81 =  -82 
4.471  4.006  -0.072  0.179 
2.400  2.798  -0.080  0.134 
2.363  2.572  -0.028  0.103 
1.393  2.809  -0.055  0.119 
0.337  3.932  -0.049  0.118 
2.672  3.546  -0.052  0.112 
2.191  1.922  0.012  0.092 
0.264  0.991  0.028  0.071 
1.512  2.716  -0.189  0.165 
4.150t  0.681  -0.150t  0.055 








Time series  regressions  by country,  81 =  -62 
6.509t  2.753  -0.762t  0.372 
-2.176t  0.586  -0.234t  0.467 
-5.678f  1.966  -0.424*  0.166 
-2.531  5.813  -0.082  0.201 
2.097t  1.057  -0.354  0.246 
2.357  4.039  -0.763t  0.249 
6.350t  1.677  0.675  0.382 
2.124t  1.779  0.106  0.132 
0.38  1.34 
0.78  1.45 
0.52  1.69 
0.00  1.38 
0.38  1.25 
0.96  3.04 
0.73  1.52 
0.00  1.78 
Notes:  tStatistical  significance  at the 10%  level. r, is an index of the intra-EMS  real  exchange  rate  (expressed  as the price  of a domestic CPI  basket  relative  to the 
price  of a GNP-weighted  basket of other EMS  countries'  CPI).  gt is the ratio of government  consumption to GNP;  gt is the GNP-weighted average of other 
EMS  countries'  gts. zt and zt are indexes of labor  productivity  (domestic  and GNP-weighted  foreign, respectively)  in the manufacturing  sector. Zt and Zt are 
comparable  indexes of labor productivity  for the entire economy. All variables  have country-specific  means removed. The cross-sectional  regression is run 
using dummy  intercept  and slope-interaction  terms for individual  years. 
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where  zt and Zt are indexes  of productivity  in the manufacturing  sector 
and entire economy,  respectively.  Table 8 is laid out in a manner similar 
to that of Table 5. However,  the sample period and selection  of countries 
are somewhat  different,  owing  to the more restrictive availability of pro- 
ductivity  data.27 Clearly, if  differences  in  relative  productivity  growth 
explain  the simple  correlation between  the real exchange  rate and gov- 
ernment  spending,  we  would  expect  f3 =  0, 81 >  0, and 62 <  0 in Equa- 
tion (4). 
Table 8 makes  several  points  clear. First, neither relative productivity 
growth  in  manufacturing  nor  differences  between  manufacturing  and 
economywide  productivity  seem  to have  the right effect on the real ex- 
change  rate; if anything,  relatively  faster productivity  growth in the do- 
mestic manufacturing  sector appears to be associated with a depreciation  of 
the real exchange  rate. Second,  the inclusion  of the relative productivity 
regressors in (4) has little effect on estimates of83. These remain as statisti- 
cally significant  as before,  with  point  estimates  essentially  unchanged. 
Thus,  accounting  for relative productivity  growth  differentials  does  not 
seem  to overturn  our result  that government  spending  affects  the  real 
exchange  rate. 
As we  have  focused  on Italy throughout  the discussion,  it is useful  to 
look  more  directly  at  the  Italian  experience  to  see  how  plausible  a 
productivity-growth  explanation  is. Here, a simple back-of-the-envelope 
calculation  suggested  by our model  reveals  that only a small fraction of 
Italy's real appreciation  (since  the  last  realignment  of January 1987) is 
likely to be due to rapid productivity growth.  Between the end of 1986 and 
the end of 1990, productivity  in the manufacturing sector grew about 17%, 
and economywide  productivity increased by about 11%  .28  Using Equation 
(3), this implies  that the predicted  change  in Italian prices is about 6%, 
which is a little more than a third of the increase of 17% in the Italian CPI 
(relative to Germany).  It seems  a much higher productivity growth rate in 
manufacturing would  be needed  to justify such a large increase in domes- 
tic prices.29 
27. We ran comparable  regressions  to those in Table  5 for the more restrictive  sample used 
for Table  8; there was no substantive  change in the coefficients. 
28. See DeNardis  and Micossi (1991). 
29. One might hypothesize that some sector  within manufacturing  should be thought  of as 
the international  sector, and that this sector grew rapidly  indeed. However, this does 
not help productivity  shocks explain Italy's real appreciation  in terms of both prices 
and wages. To  see this, suppose we pick productivity  growth in international  goods to 
be just the right size to explain the increase  in Italian  prices, i.e., dal = dp + dy = 17 + 
11 = 28%.  Under the assumption above, it is easy to show that productivity  growth in 
international  goods is entirely  responsible  for wage increases  (in terms  of international 
goods), dw = dal. (See Appendix 2.) From  this equality  it follows that, with such large 
productivity  growth in international  goods, Italian  wages should have risen by 28%. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  295 
Evidence  on Italian wages  similarly suggests  that productivity  growth 
cannot be the dominant  source of Italy's real appreciation.  First (as noted 
in footnote  29),  real wage  growth  has been  relatively  slight.  Second,  a 
number  of other factors seem  to be driving  nominal wage  increases.  For 
example,  DeNardis  and  Micossi  (1991) show  that the ratio of public to 
private wages  has grown by 14% since 1980 in Italy, while it has fallen by 
a comparable  amount  in France and  the  United  Kingdom.  Few  would 
argue  that  Italian  productivity  shocks  have  been  concentrated  in  the 
public sector. In addition,  progressive  increases  in employer  social secu- 
rity contributions  have added about 7% to total labor compensation  costs 
since  1981 and about 3% since  1986. 
3.3 IMPERFECTLY  CREDIBLE  AGGREGATE  DEMAND  POLICY 
Another  popular  explanation  of  intra-EMS  real-exchange-rate  diver- 
gences  is that credibility  of commitment  to established  parities has im- 
proved  only  slowly.  The usual  argument  is that forward-looking  Italian 
wage  setters  and  lira debt  holders  used  to believe  that Italy was,  and 
would  remain,  a high-inflation  country. But the increasingly  aggressive 
commitment  of the authorities  to a fixed DM parity continually  surprised 
the private sector, which  only  gradually changed  its beliefs.  As a result, 
the  story  goes,  expected  inflation  and  nominal  lira interest  rates have 
been  high-but  falling-as  the  central  bank  has  demonstrated  its  re- 
solve  not to devalue  the exchange  rate.30 
The  evidence  supporting  this  view  seems  secure  enough.  Figure  3 
shows  lira inflation-  and interest-rate  differentials  against  the DM. The 
interest rates are 3-month  government  borrowing  rates in Italy and Ger- 
many. Although  the inflation  differential ceased  improving  in 1987, the 
interest  differential  (which  was  considerably  larger  at  that  time)  has 
since  continued  its steady  fall to its current level  of about 3 percentage 
points. 
3.3.1 Interpreting  Evidence  on Interest Differentials  To be clear about what 
interest differentials  have to say about credibility requires some explana- 
tion.  As is well  known,  the nominal  one-period  interest  differential be- 
tween,  say, Italy and  Germany,  i_ -  iG, can be  decomposed  into  three 
However,  wages  over this period have increased by only 18%. In other words,  if a large 
productivity  shock was  behind  the increase in Italian prices, Italian real wages  should 
have increased  by 11%, much  more than the actual increase of about 1%. Our calcula- 
tions  must  be qualified  to the  extent  that they  are based  on the assumptions  that the 
productivity  shocks  are both  permanent  and  unanticipated,  and  that the  production 
function  is Cobb-Douglas. 
30. See Giovannini  (1990) and Dornbusch  (1990). 296 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
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a  interest  differential  +  inflation  d  ifferential 
parts: a country  premium,  cpt; a Lira-DM  exchange  risk premium,  rpt; 
and expected  depreciation  of the lira against the DM, As',3.31 
The  first of  these  three  components,  cpt, is  a premium  required  by 
investors  as  compensation  for possible  default  or inconvertibility  that 
might result from capital or exchange  controls,  taxes, or outright default. 
Variation in  this  premia  across  EC countries  appears  quite  small.  We 
have  already seen  in Figure 1 that the on-shore  location of these  instru- 
ments  has little impact on their pricing.  Second,  many  European coun- 
tries borrow  in dollars  and  ECU in addition  to borrowing  in their own 
currencies.  These latter differentials  can be used  to form direct measures 
of country premia,  and are indeed  very small. Table 9 shows  Eurodollar 
31. This  decomposition  is  only  approximate;  it  leaves  out  potential  interaction  among 
premia,  and  excludes  terms  associated  with  Jensen's  inequality.  Often  the  inflation 
differential  is subtracted  from the  nominal  interest  differential,  and the resulting  real 
interest  differential  is used  to analyze  credibility. (Clearly, the real differential is com- 
prised  of  the  same  country-  and  exchange-risk  premia,  in  addition  to expected  real 
depreciation.)  However,  any  given  speculator  will  use  the  nominal-not  the  real- 
interest  differential  to evaluate  alternative  investments,  so the nominal  differential is 
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Table 9  EURODOLLAR FLOATING-RATE- 
NOTE BORROWING RATES FOR 
DIFFERENT  EEC GOVERNMENTSa 
U.K.  -33.0 
Italy  -33.0 
France  -20.0 
Belgium  -19.0 
Denmark  -18.0 
Spain  -16.0 
Ireland  -2.5 
Portugal  +5.5 
aExpressed in basis points  as deviations  from the 6-month LIBOR 
rate, 11/1989. 
Source:  Salomon  Brothers. 
floating rate note borrowing  rates against the 6-month London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR). The largest possible  pairwise  differential is between 
the United  Kingdom  (or Italy) and Portugal, at less than 40 basis points. 
Most are quite a bit smaller. 
The  next  two  components  are the  exchange  risk premium,  rpt, and 
expected  currency depreciation,  Ast,1.  Several authors have attempted  to 
separate the two by estimating  models  of the risk premium and attribut- 
ing what  is left over from the interest  differential to expected  deprecia- 
tion.  Giovannini  (1990),  for example,  finds  that the  risk premium  can 
explain  little,  if any, of the  differential.32 However,  for the purposes  of 
measuring  credibility, it is not really necessary  to identify  these  compo- 
nents  individually.  If credibility  is  high,  so  that  the  exchange  rate is 
expected  to  remain  within  the  existing  band,  both components  will  be 
small.  To the  extent  that  the  sum  of  the  exchange-risk  premium  and 
expected  depreciation  is  significantly  positive,  the  peg  cannot  be fully 
credible. 
Of course,  the DM/lira rate can fluctuate within  a band of ?2.25%,  or 
+1.02254 -  1 =  9.3% on an annualized  basis.  As a result,  some  authors 
have pointed  out that-strictly  speaking-one  can conclude  little about 
the credibility of the bands  from short-term differentials.33 
32. Equilibrium  models of foreign exchange risk have notoriously poor reputations  for 
explaining interest differentials  and predictable  components of excess returns  on for- 
eign exchange (see Froot, 1990). 
33. See, for example, Svensson (1990).  While the above point is formally  correct,  it should 
not be pushed too hard. If interest  differentials  represent  expected  exchange-rate  move- 
ments within the band, then we would expect there to be a sharp  narrowing  in interest 
differentials  at longer maturities. However, there is little apparent  narrowing  in the 
longer-term  differentials  reported  below. 298 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
3.3.2 Interpreting  Evidence  on Inflation  Differentials  There is a sense,  how- 
ever,  in  which  the  improved-credibility  story  has  been  accepted  too 
readily, especially  as an explanation  of the inflation,  wage-growth,  and 
real-exchange-rate  data. To see this clearly, let us first take a hypothetical 
example: that of wage-setting  behavior in the presence  of positive  shocks 
to credibility. 
Suppose  that  nominal  wages  must  be  negotiated  one  period  in  ad- 
vance.  Suppose  for convenience  that initial Italian productivity-adjusted 
wages  are  equal  to  those  in  Germany,  but  that  Italian wage  earners 
expect  inflation.  Specifically,  let  us  assume  that  Italian wage  earners 
assign a 50% probability to a 20% devaluation  of the lira against the DM, 
and  the  remaining  50% probability  to  the  existing  parity remaining  in 
place.  Expected  depreciation  is  then  10%, so  wage  earners  set  next- 
period wages  10% higher than those  of Germany. 
What happens  when  the next period arrives and the authorities  have 
not  devalued?  We obviously  want  to assume  that credibility improves, 
so let the probability wage  earners assign  to (the same size) devaluation 
fall to  25%. Do  wages  rise  now  at  only  a 5% rate,  reaching  115% of 
German wages  in the upcoming  period? The answer is clearly no. Italy's 
wages  in that period should  be 105% of Germany's.  In other words,  when 
credibility  improves,  the sign of the wage-growth  differential  must be  reversed,  so 
as to diminish the gap between  wage levels.34 
But this has  not been  the case for Italian wages  and prices.  (Relative 
nominal  wage  movements  have been very similar to those  of the CPI35.) 
To salvage  the  credibility  explanation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  one 
would  have  to  argue  that  Italy has  substituted  more-accommodative- 
than-expected  fiscal policy for less-accommodative-than-expected  mone- 
tary policy. But in such a case it is more accurate to say that government 
spending-not  improving  credibility, per se-lies  behind  movements  in 
the real exchange  rate. 
Notwithstanding  the behavior  of prices and wages,  the narrowing  of 
3-month  interest  differentials  would  seem  to suggest  that at very short 
horizons,  Italian credibility is indeed  improving.  This leads us to look at 
the behavior  of longer-term  interest  differentials-where  forecast hori- 
34. This argument  applies  to both prices and wages  as long as they are not instantaneously 
responsive  to monetary  policy (in which case money  is neutral anyway).  For a standard 
model  of monetary  authorities'  reputation  with  the private sector see  Barro and Gor- 
don  (1983a,b).  For applications  to  the  EMS,  see  Giovannini  (1990) and  Dornbusch 
(1990). 
35. To salvage  a Barro and  Gordon  (1983) explanation,  one  would  have  to assume  that 
prices  and  wages  are set by very  long-term  contracts with  nominal  escalator clauses. 
That is,  the level  of prices in 1990 would  need  to be at least partly determined  by the 
contracts set in 1986 and 1987. Transition  to a Common  Currency  ?  299 
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zons are more similar to those relevant for wage and price setting.  Figure 
4 shows  rates on  10-year government  bonds  for Italy, France, and Ger- 
many.  Notice  that in the  early  1980s,  the  Italian and French long  rates 
were  similar, both considerably  above  the German long rate. But by the 
end of the 1980s, France's rates had been converged  to Germany's while 
Italy's remain  high.  This  suggests  that Italy has  been  slower  than  has 
France (whose  wage/price  gap  with  Germany  has not grown  nearly as 
much in recent years,  see Table 3) in obtaining credibility with long-term 
debt markets.36 
36. There is a large literature on  whether  the  EMS has generated  a credibility dividend. 
Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1989) present  evidence  that,  all else  equal,  actual inflation 
during the 1980s is lower (albeit with borderline statistical significance) than would have 
been  predicted  on the basis of the earlier data alone.  The evidence  that a similar break 
occurs  in real variables  such  as output  or unemployment  is,  however,  much weaker. 
Giavazzi and Giovannini  (1989) and DeNardis and Micossi (1991), among others, find no 
evidence  of an improved  output-inflation  trade-off, which should follow from a credibil- 
ity  enhancement.  Similarly, Dornbusch  (1990) argues  that unemployment  rates rose 
most in those  countries  that experienced  the greatest disinflations,  again providing  no 
evidence  that  the  EMS made  the  disinflations  of  high-inflation  countries  unusually 
cheap.  Weber (1990) attempts  to estimate  a formal model  of credibility directly. 300 *  FROOT & ROGOFF 
3.4 DEBT  GAPS  AND CREDIBILITY 
In  addition  to  the  competitiveness  gap  we  have  identified,  differing 
debt-GNP  ratios  also  present  a problem.  The authorities  might  find  it 
optimal  to  default  on  government  debt  through  devaluation  if  debt 
repayment  involves  distortionary  taxation.  Indeed,  much  has  been 
made  of  differing  relative  debt  burdens.  Table 10 shows  the  levels  of 
government  debt  as  a  percent  of  GNP.  Among  those  countries  with 
debt burdens  in the problematic  range,  three broad groups  can again be 
discerned  on the basis  of recent performance: Ireland has made  signifi- 
cant  steps  toward  reducing  its  debt  levels;  Belgium,  the  Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain have  stabilized  their debt ratios, which  were  grow- 
ing  rapidly  in  the  early  part of  the  1980s; and  Italy and  Greece  have 
debt levels  that are still rising consistently.  Italy and Belgium also have 
unusually  high  debt levels. 
As currency union  becomes  more likely the debt gap may pose greater 
problems  for credibility. Monetary union  provides  the government  with 
a uniquely  potent  way  of reducing  the  real value  of government  debt. 
Because all lira-denominated  contracts must be redenominated  into new 
ECU, a 20% devaluation  translates immediately  into a 20% reduction  in 
the real value  of all (nominal)  government  debt.37 Ordinarily a devalua- 
tion  is  not  nearly  this  effective,  because  prices  adjust  slowly  and  the 
government  has  to pay  an interest  premium  on  any expected  inflation 
during  the adjustment  period.38 As illustrated by our reputation  model 
below,  investors  will  recognize  the  temptations  offered by currency re- 
form, and they will charge an ever-rising premium on non-indexed  debt 
as the date of union  approaches. 
A country  does  face one  significant  drawback to devaluing  at or near 
the  time  of  currency  union,  though  it  would  not  appear  to  be  large 
enough  empirically  to outweigh  the temptation.  Other things equal, the 
Italian government  would  like its citizens to receive as many new ECU as 
possible  for their lira; this implies bringing in the lira at a high rate, not a 
low  one.  As  Table 11 shows,  Italy's current monetary  base  is 14.6% of 
37. Indeed,  due  to tax regulations  and accounting  frictions,  the government  may well be 
able  to convert  different  types  of  contracts  at different  rates.  Differential  indexation 
during a currency reform is certainly not without  precedent. 
38. Consider the following  simple example: Suppose  that all of a country's debt were in the 
form of  1-year zero-coupon  bonds,  and  that a constant  fraction of the  debt  matures 
each week.  If prices were  perfectly flexible, then of course an unanticipated  20% deval- 
uation  would  translate into a 20% reduction  in real debt,  regardless  of maturity. Sup- 
pose  instead,  however,  that the economy  is governed  by overlapping  1-year nominal 
contracts,  and (for simplicity),  that prices adjust linearly over the year in response  to a 
devaluation.  Then it is easy to see that a 20% devaluation  will produce approximately a 
10% decrease  in the real value  of debt. Table 10  GOVERNMENT  DEBT AS A PERCENT OF GNP 
Belgium  Denmark  Germany  Greece  Spain  France  Ireland  Italy  Luxbg  Nthlds  Prtgl  U.K. 
1979  71.9 
1980  80.7 
1981  89.5 
1982  98.2 
1983  107.0 
1984  112.3 
1985  119.5 
1986  123.7 
1987  131.3 
1988  132.2 
1989  129.9 

























32.0  17.1  23.9  72.7  54.0  15.6  42.0  41.0  58.4 
32.2  21.9  25.3  78.9  63.5  15.4  48.7  40.6  58.6 
36.2  26.7  26.7  85.1  66.4  15.2  53.1  45.7  58.8 
40.3  31.5  28.1  91.2  69.2  15.0  57.6  50.9  58.9 
44.3  36.3  29.5  97.4  72.0  14.8  62.0  56.0  59.1 
53.2  42.8  31.8  102.4  77.2  15.0  66.1  61.4  60.4 
62.5  47.6  33.2  104.7  84.0  14.0  69.7  69.5  59.0 
65.3  48.5  34.2  115.7  88.5  13.8  71.7  68.4  58.1 
71.5  48.7  34.9  118.5  92.9  12.0  75.3  71.6  56.1 
79.7  44.5  35.9  115.4  96.1  10.2  77.4  74.0  51.0 
85.1  45.2  36.0  104.7  98.9  8.8  77.6  71.5  45.7 
89.5  44.7  36.1  101.4  100.9  7.8  77.8  67.8  43.0 
Source:  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). 302 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
Table  11  MONETARY  BASE  AND GDP IN THE  EEC,  1988  (PERCENT) 
Share  of  Monetary 
Monetary  base/GDP  Share  of GDP  in EC  base  in EC 
Belgium  7.5  3.2  2.6 
Denmark  3.7  2.3  0.9 
France  5.8  20.0  12.5 
Germany  9.9  25.3  26.9 
Greece  14.9  1.1  1.8 
Ireland  10.1  0.7  0.7 
Italy  14.6  17.5  27.4 
Netherlands  8.1  4.8  4.2 
Portugal  13.5  0.9  1.3 
Spain  20.4  7.2  15.7 
U.K.  3.3  17.0  6.0 
Total  9.3  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Glick  and Hutchinson  (1990). 
GDP, and indeed  accounts  for over a quarter of the EC's total monetary 
base. A 20% devaluation  at the time of union would  amount to a sacrifice 
of 3% of GDP.39  However,  this effect is probably overstated  because,  as 
we  have  argued  earlier, Italy's monetary  base is likely to shrink rapidly 
after  1992.  Unified  banking  regulations  will  prevent  the  government 
from forcing banks to hold large quantities  of required reserves. 
4. The  Finite Horizon  Problem  and the Transition  to 
Monetary  Union 
Given  that the  EMS appears  to be functioning  smoothly  even  after the 
removal  of capital controls,  what  could  be wrong  with  Delors'  plan  of 
seamless  gradual transition  to monetary  union? Surely the credibility of 
the current exchange  rate bands  can only  increase  as Europe's  govern- 
ments  take steps  to permanently  lock themselves  into monetary  union. 
Indeed,  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  continual  forward  momentum  is 
precisely  the glue  that has held  the EMS together  thus far. (Making the 
EMS work has sometimes  been  compared  to riding a bicycle; if you stop 
pedaling  forward,  you  fall down.) 
In  the  preceding  sections  we  have  identified  a  number  of  coun- 
tervailing factors that might  tempt  some  of the EC countries  to devalue 
their exchange  rate. Clearly a devaluation  will not improve  competitive- 
ness  in the long  run. The long-run  real exchange  rate will fall only once 
39. If the devaluation  occurs sufficiently far before union,  this cost disappears entirely, since 
the nominal  lira money  supply  will rise by an amount  proportional to the devaluation. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  303 
the  path  of  government  spending  drops  or factors  shift  between  the 
traded and nontraded  goods  sectors.  But a devaluation  could  make the 
adjustment  to lower  government  spending  easier, temporarily cushion- 
ing  the  effects  on  employment  and  output.  This,  of course,  presumes 
some  Keynesian  price rigidity. In such  a case,  there might  be a tempta- 
tion  to  devalue  even  with  no  change  in  government  spending.  This 
temptation  may become  especially  great as currency union  approaches. 
To the  extent  that  devaluations  improve  the  terms  of  trade,  12-hour 
devaluations  hold out the prospect  of a final, unanswerable  beggar-thy- 
neighbor  gain: He who  devalues  last, devalues  best. 
In the subsection  below,  we  formalize  these  ideas  using  a simple  off- 
the-shelf  model  of monetary  policy reputation in which  the central bank 
has a finite  horizon.  As  long  as the  future  date of union  is far enough 
away,  the  central  bank  will  not  break its  commitment  to maintain  the 
exchange  rate. As the date of union  approaches,  however,  the odds  of a 
devaluation  increase.  If private agents  recognize  this, they may push  up 
the price of multiperiod  nominal  contracts (such as wage  and debt con- 
tracts). These  increases  make it more likely that at least one more round 
of exchange  rate adjustments  will in fact occur. 
An important  insight  from this paradigm is that accelerating the date 
of monetary  union  (as many  have  suggested)  will not necessarily  tem- 
per  current  interest-rate  and  inflation  differentials.  Indeed,  it  could 
exacerbate  them.  One  way  to  avoid  this  problem  is  for  the  high- 
temptation  countries  to find ways  to signal  their commitment,  perhaps 
by indexing  domestic  debt  to ECU or by  taking extraordinary steps  to 
commit not to devalue  (perhaps  by tying exchange  rates firmly to other 
EC agreements).40 
4.1 A MODEL  OF THE  TEMPTATION  TO DEVALUE  WITH 
IMPENDING  MONETARY  UNION 
The following  finite-horizon  Barro-Gordon  (1983a) type model captures 
the  two  striking  features  of  monetary  union  we  have  identified:  the 
central bank  will  give  up  the  ability  to  change  the  exchange  rate at a 
known  date,  and  the  temptation  to  devalue  will  grow  as  union  ap- 
proaches.  (Our key policy  conclusions  depend  more on the first feature 
than the second41.) Denote  dt as the actual rate of devaluation  at time t, 
40. We must  note  that the  model  neglects  the  effects  of devaluation  on a country's  part- 
ners. For example,  if Italy inflates sharply just prior to monetary union,  it may damage 
the antiinflationary  reputation  of the postunion  Eurobank. But to the extent that infla- 
tion relieves  the real burden  of Italian government  debt,  it could actually increase  the 
antiinflationary  resolve  of the Eurobank. 
41. The model  here is an extension  of Rogoff (1989), which builds on the general approach 
of Milgrom and Roberts (1982). See also Tabellini (1983) and Barro (1986). 304 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
and d\ as the  expected  rate of devaluation  based  on  t -  1 information. 
Assume  further that the government  bears a one-time  cost C to reneging 
on its commitment  not to inflate. This cost, which  might have to do with 
the  impact  of  devaluation  on  other  EC agreements,  is  known  by  the 
central bank but not by the public.  Assume  that the central bank has a 
loss function  given  by 
T 
E  PtLt(dt,  d,  C),  (5) 
t=O 
Lt(dt,dt,  C)  -wt(dt  -  d)  +  2dt +  2R(C,d,_,  .  .), 
where  1/2 <  3 <  1 and R = C if dt =  0 for all t > 0; R = 0 otherwise.  Each 
period, the central bank perceives a gain to surprise devaluation  (through 
either the debt or real exchange  rate channels  we have identified). 
The higher  wt, the higher  the short-term gain.  (It is assumed  that w E 
[0,1].) To capture the rising gain to debt default and competitive  devalua- 
tion, we  assume  that wt+  > wt. The d2  term denotes  the costs associated 
with changing  the exchange  rate; these (for simplicity) are assumed  to be 
proportional  to the  square of the size  of the devaluation.  The reneging 
cost, C, is uniformly  distributed on the interval [0,,/]; the public knows  u 
but not C. It updates  its priors using  Bayes' rule. 
It is easy  to see that once  the government  has broken its commitment 
and lost its reputation,  it will shift to a crawling peg in which dt = wt in all 
subsequent  periods.  It is similarly easy  to check that the one-time  gain 
from reneging  is w2/2, so  that the  government  will  stick to its commit- 
ment  even  in  the  last  period  if C -  w2T.  Of course,  if the  public  were 
certain that the  government  would  renege  in the final period,  then  its 
reputation  would  unravel  in all previous  periods  as well.  In the case of 
the  EMS,  it  is  quite  probable  that  the  public  is  unsure  whether  the 
government's  commitment  is  binding  or not.  For example,  it may  be 
difficult for the public  to judge  the general  status of intergovernmental 
bargaining over economic  union  issues,  and therefore the cost of forcing 
a devaluation. 
The basic nature of a solution  to this problem is as follows.  If the time 
to monetary union is sufficiently  distant,  the government  will not renege 
on its exchange  rate commitment  even if its fixed cost is zero. The cost in 
terms  of  high  future  expected  devaluations  outweighs  the  short-term 
benefits.  However,  as the currency merger date approaches,  the govern- 
ment  will  eventually  devalue  if its cost is below  the critical value  w2. It 
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Denote  Ct  as the highest  cost type that first devalues  at time t, and crt  as 
the probability the public attaches to a devaluation  at time t, conditional 
on not having  observed  a devaluation  in any period t -  1 or earlier. Then 
it is  easy  to  show  that  in  a  sequential  equilibrium,  the  public  forms 
inflationary expectations  according to Bayes' rule 
ct 
- 
Ct-\  -  t  1  (6)  p. -  Ct-1 
where  Ct is given  by 
= 't+l 
- 
Wt+l  (7) 
2pw3zl 
Equation (6) simply  says  that the public's  expectations  that the govern- 
ment will inflate depend  on the range of types who  would  first inflate in 
period t normalized  by the size of the remaining pool.  Equation (7) says 
that the highest  cost type who would  first inflate in period t is one who is 
indifferent  between  first  devaluing  in  period  t and  first devaluing  in 
period  t +  1. One  can show  that the public's expectations  of a devalua- 
tion rise as the date of currency union  approaches.  Note that the system 
need  not  collapse  under  a speculative  attack because  at no  point  is  a 
devaluation  certain.42 Rather, the government  would  be forced to pay a 
high  inflation  premium  on its debt.  The higher  the trajectory of w, the 
more likely that there will ultimately  be a devaluation.43 
A key point  from the model  is that pushing  up the date of monetary 
union  may  do  nothing  to  enhance  credibility. Rather, pushing  up  the 
date would  lead to a sharp rise in interest  rates. Of course,  moving  the 
date  all  the  way  up  to  the  present,  and  then  announcing  it as  a fait 
accompli,  would  prevent  the possibility  of realignment.  (We are certainly 
not advocating  such a policy, since a devaluation  may be desirable.) 
4.2 SIGNALING  COMMITMENT  TO EXCHANGE  RATE  BANDS 
As  it stands,  the  model  does  not  permit  signaling.  If the  government 
knows  it will never devalue  (e.g.,  that the cost C of breaking its commit- 
ment is very high),  then it should  index its debt to ECU (thereby avoid- 
42. Obstfeld  (1988) explores  the implications  of speculative  attacks in EMS-type currency 
arrangements. 
43. The upward-sloping  trajectory of w has an ambiguous  effect on the timing of devalua- 
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ing  the payment  of a currency-default  premium)  or seek  to irrevocably 
fix  the  exchange  rate  immediately.  Indeed,  the  public  may  expect  to 
observe  some  action  of this  type  if the  government  is serious  about its 
commitment.  If this  is the  case,  then  failure to index  or to announce  a 
completed  union  would  be seen as a sign of lack of commitment,  and the 
exchange  rate might  then  become  very  vulnerable  to speculation.  The 
government  would  likely have  to pay a high  premium  on non-indexed 
debt. As long  as the time to union  is sufficiently  far off, the government 
might be able to index its debt gradually, reducing its short-term tempta- 
tion as the future value  of reputation  falls. 
There  may  be  other  ways  to  signal  commitment.  For example,  the 
Italian central bank has  recently  been  given  a greater degree  of auton- 
omy. This may be helpful under the current system  (via the usual conser- 
vative  central banker  credibility argument),  but may not help  much  in 
dealing  with  the  credibility  programs  posed  by currency union,  which 
involves  sharply curtailing the autonomy  of national central banks. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
Though  inflation  rates  in  the  EMS  countries  have  significantly  con- 
verged  over  the  past  decade,  exchange-rate  adjusted  price levels  have 
sharply diverged  and continue  to do so,  albeit at a decreasing  rate. The 
empirical evidence  suggests  that high government  spending  in Italy and 
other high real exchange  rate countries may provide a significant compo- 
nent  of  the  explanation.  If these  levels  of  government  spending  are 
unsustainable-and  evidence  on  budget  deficits  and  current accounts 
suggests  that they are-then  eventually  an adjustment  will have to take 
place.  The need  for this adjustment  may provide  some  countries  with a 
significant  temptation  to  devalue  during  the  transition  to  monetary 
union; the problem  is only exacerbated by high debt/GNP ratios. 
We have also argued that the reputation built by weaker central banks 
over the past decade will not automatically provide credibility during the 
transition to a common  currency. We present  a simple theoretical model 
that suggests  that the probability the public attaches to devaluation  may 
become  higher  and  higher  as the known  fixed date of monetary  union 
approaches.  Indeed,  the behavior  of prices, wages,  and long-term inter- 
est rates suggests  that this process  may already have begun. 
If the government  does  not intend  to devalue,  then  it can signal  this 
by indexing  debt.  Of  course,  such  signals  are costly, because  they  in- 
volve  foreclosing  a valuable  option  for defaulting  on government  debt. 
Either  way,  the  model  strongly  suggests  that  accelerating  monetary 
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progress  of  the  EMS so  far does  not  ensure  a seamless  transition  to a 
common  currency. 
It is  important  to  note  that  we  have  not  provided  a comprehensive 
assessment  of  the  welfare  aspects  of  exchange  rate realignments.  For 
stabilization  purposes,  an  early  adjustment  of  parities  may  indeed  be 
beneficial.  Rather, we  show  that a plan built around  a seamless  transi- 
tion without  changes  in current parities may not be stable. 
APPENDIX 1: BACKGROUND:  THE SURPRISING 
MATURATION  AND LONGEVITY  OF THE  EMS 
When the European Monetary System first went into effect in March 1979, 
one would  scarcely have believed  that within just 10 years there would be 
serious discussion  of a single European currency. True, Eurocrats in Brus- 
sels  have  long  dreamed  of issuing  a EC currency  through  a European 
Central  Bank.  But  a  decade  ago,  the  European  Currency  Unit  (ECU) 
seemed  to have little more chance of becoming Europe's currency than the 
SDR (the International Monetary Fund's accounting unit) did of becoming 
the world's currency. Surely no major European country would be willing 
to  relinquish  its  sovereign  right  to  the  seignorage  tax.  Besides,  some 
governments  such as Italy's were far more dependent  on seignorage reve- 
nues  than others  such as Germany's. 
For that matter, there was  every reason to be skeptical about whether 
the  EMS would  succeed  even  in  its  more  modest  goal  of  stabilizing 
exchange  rates  across  the  founding  members  (Germany, France, Italy, 
the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland,  and  Luxembourg;  Spain 
joined  in June 1989, and  the  United  Kingdom  in October 1990).44  After 
all, a similar attempt  in the  early  1970s (the  "Snake") had been  a con- 
spicuous  failure.45 How  long  would  a country  such  as  Italy, with  an 
inflation rate well into double  digits,  be able to stabilize its exchange rate 
against  low-inflation  Germany?  The  answer,  of course,  is not  forever. 
Nevertheless,  the  EMS  survived  in  its  early  years  because  it  has 
enough  built-in  flexibility  to handle  persistent  divergences  in inflation. 
First, members  are not obliged  to fix their bilateral rates but only to keep 
them within  a 4.5% band  (?2.25%  of a "central" rate); indeed  Italy was 
44. Technically  speaking, the United Kingdom was also a member  of the EMS  from the 
outset. But until very recently (October  1990),  it did not participate  in the only signifi- 
cant aspect of the EMS, the exchange rate mechanism (ERM).  European  Monetary 
Union is envisioned to ultimately  include  the other  EC  members,  Greece,  and Portugal. 
45. The only loyal members  of the Snake, which began in April 1972,  were Germany,  the 
Netherlands,  Belgium,  and Luxembourg.  France  pulled out in February  1973,  though it 
briefly  rejoined  in 1975.  Italy  pulled out in January  1974. 308 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
originally  permitted  to  use  12% bands.46 More importantly,  the  bands 
can be  shifted,  albeit only  with  multilateral agreement.  During  its first 
several years,  the  EMS experienced  frequent  realignments  (Fig. 5). De- 
spite these  periodic  realignments,  the EMS was  immediately  successful 
in  enhancing  exchange  rate  stability  by  any  measure:  nominal,  real, 
trade-weighted,  conditional  or unconditional  variance, or mean absolute 
changes.  However,  the  early  EMS appears  to have  owed  much  of  its 
success  to the use  of capital controls.47 By the mid 1980s, the consensus 
belief  was  that without  the  capital controls,  the EMS would  be ripped 
apart by speculative  attacks. 
In light of this early consensus,  the recent performance of the EMS has 
been  nothing  short  of remarkable.  It has  continued  to hold  up despite 
the  virtual  dismantling  of  capital  controls;  by  mid-1990  the  last major 
capital controls  in Italy and France had been removed.  In fact, there has 
not  been  a realignment  in  over  4 years  now;  the  last  episode  was  in 
January 1987. 
Obviously,  with  capital controls  gone,  the continuing  survival  of the 
EMS depends  critically on significant  coordination  of monetary policies. 
Most would  agree  that the  current regime  is not  symmetric; Germany, 
with its strong penchant  for low inflation,  is the leader. Indeed,  one can 
plausibly  argue  that  Italy and  France have  used  the  EMS to  enhance 
their own antiinflation  credibility. (France's policy of fighting inflation by 
religiously  pegging  the DM has sometimes  been referred to as its "Franc 
fort" policy.48) 
1. Stage  III:  a single  European  currency  with  a Bundesbank- 
style  central  bank 
The  classic  literature  on  optimum  currency  areas  (Mundell,  1961; Mc- 
Kinnon,  1963) is based  on an implicit Keynesian  stabilization framework 
46. Recently,  Italy reduced its margins  to 2.25%.  The newest active EMS  members,  Spain 
and the United Kingdom, still have 6%  bands. The bilateral  exchange-rate  bands are 
supplemented by an "indicator  of divergence,"  which essentially  measures  the devia- 
tion of a weighted average of a country's EMS-currency  exchange rates against a 
weighted average of its bilateral  central  rates. When the divergence  indicator  reaches 
75%  of its maximum  value, a country  is (in principle)  obligated  to undertake  corrective 
changes in fiscal and monetary  policy.  In practice,  a country  often hits a bilateral  limit 
before the divergence indicator  becomes operative. 
47. See Rogoff (1985),  Artis and Taylor  (1988),  Giavazzi  and Giovannini  (1989). 
48. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) argue that Italy and France used the EMS to achieve 
antiinflation credibility by  letting  Germany serve  as  their "conservative central 
banker."  A cynic might argue that there  would have been a revaluation  of the DM over 
the past 2 years were it not for the inflationary  impact  of German  reunification,  but this 
hardly  diminishes the system's recent  success. Transition  to a Common  Currency  * 309 
,i  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




c  2.4 - 
E  c  2.2- 
m4  2- 
.  1.8- 
*  1.6 -  ,,  ^ 
& 1.4- 
1.2- 
S  1- 






0  t 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
and emphasizes degree of openness,  and capital and labor mobility.49 
Kenen (1969)  stresses the importance  of industrial  diversification  within 
the union. Since the vast majority  of EC  countries'  trade  is with other EC 
members, and since there is nearly perfect capital mobility among the 
major countries, the EC already meets two of the classic criteria.  After 
1992, with  harmonization of  licensing standards, there will  also be 
greater  labor mobility.50  Finally,  the EC is highly diversified  industrially. 
Thus, at a glance, the EMS would appear to satisfy the conventional 
stabilization  criteria  for currency  union.51 
Aside  from  stabilization  issues,  there  are  also  some  public  finance 
49. It is clearly  not our purpose here to provide  a comprehensive  welfare  evaluation  of the 
pluses and minuses of stage III of the Delors' plan, that is of ultimate European 
Monetary  Union. Our main points do not particularly  depend on the precise  final  form 
of the union, so we limit our welfare  analysis  of stage III  to the brief  discussion  below. 
The most comprehensive discussion of the welfare effects of EMU is presented in 
Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). 
50. The early  literature's  emphasis on labor  mobility  was based on models in which nomi- 
nal wages are permanently  fixed. Most economists  today would probably  place  far  less 
emphasis on labor mobility since in practice, nominal wages are probably  adjusted 
more quickly  than workers  can be moved. 
51. See Eichengreen  (1990)  for a more critical  assessment of whether the EMS  is indeed an 
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criteria to  consider,  though  the  size  of  these  effects  are probably  not 
huge.52 Some  of the EEC countries  (such as Greece,  and Portugal) raise 
2-3% of GNP via seignorage  revenues,  but most raise less than 1% (see 
Table 12).  Since  monetary  union  is  envisioned  to  produce  a very  low 
community  inflation  rate, the loss  in seignorage  revenues  might be sig- 
nificant for some  governments.  However,  these  governments  are going 
to lose  most  of these  revenues  after Economic  Union  in  1992, anyway. 
Because  they  will be compelled  to open  their countries  to foreign bank- 
ing competition  and because  of new  regulation  standards,  high seignor- 
age  countries  will  no  longer  be  able  to force  their own  banks  to hold 
large quantities of non-interest-bearing  reserves.  Also, with the prolifera- 
tion  of  alternative  financial  assets,  the  demand  for real balances  will 
drop.53 
Obviously,  the move  to one  currency will economize  on transactions 
costs involved  in changing  currencies.  These are generally thought  to be 
large only  for tourists,  but a recent study  by the European Commission 
challenges  this  view.54 The  study  argues  that by moving  to a common 
currency, the EC could save on transactions costs of from 0.25 to 0.4% of 
community  GDP per annum.  The bulk of these  savings  (roughly 70%) is 
composed  of exchange  margin and commission  fees paid to banks. This 
estimate  is obtained  using  two approaches,  one based on banking reve- 
nue  data,  and  one  based  on  estimates  of  firm and  household  foreign 
exchange  operations  and  their  respective  average  transactions  costs. 
(The  bank  revenue  data  are  derived  from  a  comprehensive  1989 BIS 
survey  of  major banks  and  foreign  exchange  dealers  in 20 countries.) 
The remainder  of  the  savings  are to come  in the  form of in-house  ac- 
counting  savings,  and the EC estimates  are based in part on an officially 
commissioned  study by a private accounting  firm. 
It is very likely  that the transactions  savings  would  be largest for the 
52. See Casella  (1989)  for further  discussion of fiscal  aspects of currency  unions. 
53. It is actually  possible that Monetary  Union will enable  the EC  countries  to garner  some 
seignorage revenues from abroad, if their new currency  partly  displaces the dollar  in 
the world underground  economy. Estimates  of U.S. currency  held abroad  are specula- 
tive, but a figure  of half the monetary  base, or over $100  billion,  is plausible.  If the EC  is 
able to capture a market half this large, then EC seignorage revenues could easily 
amount to 2 or 3 billion  dollars  per year. The mark  is already  an international  currency, 
so Germany  would be giving up some external  revenue. However, the Bundesbank 
estimates that only 7 to 10 billion (out of total currency  holdings of 180  billion)  marks 
are presently held abroad.  (We  are grateful  to the Bundesbank  for releasing  these data 
for our study). Of course, if substitution  between ECUs  and dollars  in the underground 
economy becomes significant, then increased currency  substitution  could destabilize 
rates  between the dollar  and the ECU. 
54. See the Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). Transition  to a Common  Currency  * 311 
Table  12  SEIGNORAGE  IN THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY  AS PERCENT  OF GNP 
1982  1987 
Belgium  0.0  0.2 
Denmark  0.1  -1.1 
France  1.3  0.3 
Germany  0.5  0.8 
Greece  3.4  3.0 
Ireland  0.2  0.6 
Italy  1.5  0.6 
Netherlands  0.5  0.7 
Portugal  5.9  2.7 
Spain  1.9  1.2 
U.K.  0.2  0.1 
Source:  Seignorage  is calculated from the change in the supply  of currency 
in circulation plus increases  in required reserves less interest paid on total 
required reserves.  See Gros (1989). 
smallest  members  of  the  EC,  since  Germany  and  France  are  able  to 
conduct many external transactions  in their own currency. If the transac- 
tions  gains  are indeed  as large as the  EC estimates,  they  could  indeed 
compensate  for any loss in seignorage  revenues. 
Can the transactions  costs  really be almost half a percent of EC GDP? 
Part of the need  for multinational  companies  to keep  separate books  in 
different  currencies  comes  from the need  to satisfy different regulatory 
and tax requirements.  But if this is the case,  then the major savings  will 
come not from a move  to a single currency but from harmonization  of tax 
regulations  across  borders.  Similarly, regulatory  restrictions  on  banks' 
ability  to  issue  foreign  currency  instruments  may  well  account  for  a 
significant  portion  of the bank margin and commission  estimates.  How- 
ever, it may be difficult  to reap savings  in this area without  going  to a 
common  currency. 
It is possible  to come up with other arguments  for currency union.  For 
example,  imaginative  economists  at  the  European  Commission  have 
managed  to  obtain  much  higher  estimates  of  the  benefits  of  currency 
union  by using  new  growth  theory  models  to argue that the exchange 
rate risk premium  lowers  the steady-state  growth rate of the economy.55 
55. Again,  see One Market, One Money,  op. cit. 312 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
APPENDIX  2: FISCAL  POLICY,  PRODUCTIVITY,  AND 
THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE 
In this appendix, we present a standard neoclassical model that can be 
used to interpret the empirical results presented in the text on fiscal 
policy, productivity shocks, and the real exchange rate. As we have 
already noted,  a broad range of neoclassical trade models yields the 
result that an increase in government spending will cause the real ex- 
change rate to appreciate.  The key assumption is that a larger  fraction  of 
government spending falls on the home good than does private spend- 
ing.  The model  presented here emphasizes the distinction between 
traded and nontraded goods.56 
Consider a small country that takes the price of tradeables and the 
world interest rate r (denominated in terms of tradeables) as given. 
Assume that the representative  agent has a utility function given by 
U -  'E  CN  tCt  )  -c  1  (8) 
t=o1  -o- 
where  CNt  denotes  consumption  of the nontraded  good at time t, and CTt 
denotes consumption of the traded good. Letting P denote the relative 
price of nontradeables in terms of tradeables, the budget constraint of 
the representative  agent is given by 
Wt+ =  r(W,  +  t +  PtNt  -  CTt - 
PtCNt -  ),  (9) 
where Wt denotes  wealth entering time t (measured in units of the 
tradeable  good),  and  YTt and  YNt  denote  domestic  production  of  the 
tradeable and the nontradeable good,  respectively. For now, we  will 
assume that both types of output are exogenous. Tt denotes lump-sum 
taxes. 
Since Ricardian  equivalence holds here, one can assume without loss 
of generality  that the government  runs a balanced budget: 
56. The model developed here follows Dornbusch (1983)  and Frenkel  and Razin (1987). 
Baxter  and Cruccini (1990) and Stockman and Tesar (1990) have used this class of 
models to explore open-economy real business cycles driven by productivity  shocks. 
Ahmed (1986)  explores a model of fiscal  policy that distinguishes  between exportables 
and importables,  rather  than between traded  and nontraded  goods. This type of model 
generally yields qualitatively  similar  results for the effects of permanent  fiscal policy 
changes on the real exchange  rate, though the dynamics  differ  somewhat  for the cause 
of transitory  disturbances.  Finally,  one can also get the result  that  fiscal  policy  raises  the 
price of nontraded  goods in a model in which government  spending is highly service 
intensive, and where nontraded  goods production  is more  labor-intensive  than traded- 
goods production. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  313 
rt = PtGt.  (10) 
Maximizing  (8) with  respect  (9), imposing  the usual  non-Ponzi  scheme 
assumption  on  borrowing,  and  recognizing  that the  private  sector will 
internalize  the budget  constraint  (10) yields 
CTt+l  (  YNt  -  Gt  )(0,--  =1  (r  )  (of+a-  (  t  t-  av(-  +a -as)  (1  1) 
CTt  YNt+l  Gt+l 
and 
aCTt 
P  CT  ' 
(12) 
(1  -  a)(YNt-  Gt) 
In both (11) and (12), we  have imposed  the equilibrium condition  that 
CNt  =  YNt -  G,  (13) 
since the country cannot borrow or lend nontraded  goods. 
1. Government  spending  shocks 
By inspection  of (11) and (12), it follows  immediately  that a permanent  rise 
in government  spending  permanently  raises the real exchange  rate P. If 
rf, =  1 and nontraded-goods  production  is constant,  there is no impact 
on the current account. 
A temporary  (unanticipated)  rise in G leads  to more complex  dynam- 
ics. Whereas  it is straightforward  to show  that the impact effect on P is 
still positive,  the impact effect on the current account is ambiguous  and 
depends  on  whether  a  is  greater  than  one.  As  Dornbusch  (1983) has 
shown,  a temporary  rise in the current price of nontradeables  leads to a 
rise in the consumption-based  real interest rate. Whether current traded- 
goods  consumption  rises  or  falls  depends  on  the  size  of  the  income 
versus  substitution  effects. 
The assumption  underlying  the regressions  reported in the text is that 
the  elasticity  of inter-temporal  substitution  is equal to unity,  cr =  1. In 
this  case,  lagged  government  spending  shocks  do  not  affect  the  real 
exchange  rate, nor do anticipated  G shocks. 
2. Productivity  shocks 
An unanticipated  permanent  rise in productivity in the traded goods  sec- 
tor (a rise in Yt)  has similar effects to a permanent increase in government 
spending  on nontradeables.  In either case, the relative supply of nontrade- 314 *  FROOT  & ROGOFF 
ables falls and P rises. A perfectly anticipated increase in Yt  has, of course, 
a much smaller effect on P. Indeed,  in the case where output is exogenous, 
if rf3  = 1 and YN-G is constant,  then an anticipated traded-goods  produc- 
tivity shock has no effect on P. Consumption  of traded goods is smoothed 
perfectly over time as in Hall (1978). Similarly, a temporary shock to Yt  has 
much less  of an impact effect on P than does  a permanent  shock.  How- 
ever, the impact effect on the current account of a temporary increase in Y 
is unambiguous;  the current account moves  into surplus. 
3. Endogenous  output 
The above results readily extend  to the case where there is a fixed supply 
of capital in both sectors and where  labor is freely mobile between  them. 
Suppose  that 
YT  =  ATtL  (14) 
YN = ANtLeNt  (15) 
where changes  in At  and ANt represent productivity  shocks to the traded 
and nontraded  goods  sectors,  and where  aggregate labor supply,  L = LT 
+  LN is fixed.  In this case, P is given  by 
aCTTt  ATtOTLTt-1 
P, =  =  (16) 
(1  - 
a)(YNt -  G)  ANtONLtN-1 
When  output  is endogenous,  the  effect  of a permanent  government 
spending  shock  on  P  is  tempered  by  a flow  of  labor into  nontraded 
goods  production.  It is  also  straightforward  to  show  that an unantici- 
pated permanent  rise in traded goods  productivity  ATt  leads to a perma- 
nent  rise in P just large enough  to offset any intersectoral movement  of 
labor. (This is assuming  that the  shock  is not diversified  away  interna- 
tionally.) When shocks  to productivity  in both sectors are permanent and 
unanticipated,  then  their effect on the relative price of nontraded  goods 
is given  by 
dpt = daTt  -  daNt,  (17) 
where  lower  case  letters  denote  changes  in  logarithms.57 Letting  total 
output  be given  by Yt =  YTt  +  YNt, it is straightforward to show  that the 
rate of change  in the domestic  CPI is given  by 
57. Note, however, that a perfectly anticipated  increase in ATt  does have an effect on P, 
since there are labor  flows between the sectors. Transition  to a Common  Currency  *  315 
dpc,t  =  (1  -  y)dpt =  daTt -  dy,,  (18) 
where  y is  the  share  of international-goods  value-added  in  GNP. 
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Comment 
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
MIT 
The Froot-Rogoff  paper offers refreshing  new  directions  of research on 
real exchange  rates.  At  the  same  time  it  takes  up  and  reinforces  an 
already existing  important  literature on the complications  posed  by po- 
tential regime  changes.  Regime  changes  pose  a potential problem when 
they actually occur but may not be persistent.  They are also a complicat- 
ing factor when  they lie ahead,  and economic  agents must focus on their 
implications  for asset prices. 
In these  comments  I address  three  issues:  (1) a neglected  aspect  of 
currency unification,  which is par clearing, (2) the plausibility that govern- 
ment spending  is really the chief driving force for real exchange rates, and 
(3) the  issue  of  transition  and  what  might  happen  on  the  eve  in  the 
markets of countries  with  excessive  debt or overvalued  exchange  rates. 
1. Par  Clearing 
The discussion  of the benefits  of a common  money  focus conventionally 
on the savings  of transactions  costs.  This is the approach taken by Froot 
and  Rogoff,  and  it is also  the  case  in the  important  research effort re- 
ported  by  the  European  Commission  (1990). But there is an important 
aspect of transactions  costs that is entirely omitted,  namely  par clearing 
for checks.  The point  is simply  this: fixed exchange  rates do not assure 
per se clearing of checks at face value,  nor does a common  currency as is 
well known  from the historical experience  of the United States.1 
In the United  States the Federal Reserve act imposed  par clearing as a 
responsibility  of member  banks.  Prior to the foundation  of the Federal 
Reserve exchange,  rates between  cities in the United States were flexible, 
a common  currency  notwithstanding.  Par clearing,  then,  is something 
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1. Par  Clearing 
The discussion  of the benefits  of a common  money  focus conventionally 
on the savings  of transactions  costs.  This is the approach taken by Froot 
and  Rogoff,  and  it is also  the  case  in the  important  research effort re- 
ported  by  the  European  Commission  (1990). But there is an important 
aspect of transactions  costs that is entirely omitted,  namely  par clearing 
for checks.  The point  is simply  this: fixed exchange  rates do not assure 
per se clearing of checks at face value,  nor does a common  currency as is 
well known  from the historical experience  of the United States.1 
In the United  States the Federal Reserve act imposed  par clearing as a 
responsibility  of member  banks.  Prior to the foundation  of the Federal 
Reserve exchange,  rates between  cities in the United States were flexible, 
a common  currency  notwithstanding.  Par clearing,  then,  is something 
1. See also the discussion  in Dornbusch  (1990).  1. See also the discussion  in Dornbusch  (1990). 318 *  DORNBUSCH 
that must  be introduced  to fully  facilitate an efficient  transactions  sys- 
tem. Par clearing will not come spontaneously;  in fact commercial banks 
that  presently  benefit  from  a highly  ineffective  payments  system  will 
oppose  it. 
The European  Communities  could  make headway  on this issue  even 
before currency unification  actually takes place. Certainly for those coun- 
tries tempted  to suppress  exchange  margins  altogether,  a move  to par 
clearing would  greatly add to the transactions  benefits.  In fact, without 
par  clearing  most  transactions  benefits  from  a  fixed  rate  will  not  be 
reaped. 
2. Expectations 
In focusing  on  the  effects  of  the  EMS on  exchange  rate expectations, 
Froot and Rogoff rightly note  the narrowing  of interest  differentials be- 
tween  high inflation countries  and Germany. They also point to a puzzle 
of why  the term structure of interest  differentials  is so flat: why  does  a 
sustained  policy  of  disinflation  not  translate  into  a reduced  long-run 
expectation  of inflation  differentials  and hence  of interest differentials?2 
One possible  argument  is that in the short run governments  are com- 
mitted to the policy; in the longer run it either succeeds  and thus justifies 
a narrowing  of differentials  or else it fails and therefore leads to a major 
attempt to realign exchange  rates. In the latter event there would  at least 
be a maxi-devaluation  and  possibly  a return to high  inflation  and  pro- 
tracted depreciation.  In such a setting  the long-term  interest differential 
must recognize  both possibilities,  and hence  a relatively flat term struc- 
ture of differentials  merely  reflects remaining  scepticism  about the sus- 
tainability and success  of policies. 
The critical argument  here  is that sustaining  a fixed exchange  rate in 
the  face of inflation  differentials  leaves  open  how  the  overvaluation  is 
ultimately  undone.  It is  simply  not  the  case  that workers  or investors 
need  to assume  that just because  a policy has been followed  in the past, 
it will be more  likely  to be followed  in the future and that accordingly 
Bayesian  updating  is  appropriate.  To answer  what  the  updating  rule 
should  be  we  also  need  to make  assumptions  about what  the  govern- 
ment  is trying  to achieve  and what  tolerance  it has to bear the costs  of 
protracted deflation. 
Of  course,  in  a  game  where  the  only  issue  is  expectations  and  no 
actual disinflation  costs arise from long-term contracting and the like the 
credibility problem  is not a serious  one.  In fact, however,  disinflation  is 
2. On the same argument  see Dornbusch  (1989). Comment  *  319 
hard and  sitting  out  the  process  for a decade  is not the rule.  It was  in 
Ireland, but it is equally clear that Spain may not have the stomach for it, 
at least not so far. 
3. Real Exchange  Rates 
The most interesting  and controversial  part of Froot and Rogoff's  paper 
deals with the hypothesis  that divergent  trends of government  spending 
drive real exchange  rates between  countries.  The analysis  is open  to a 
number of criticisms. 
My first point  is  that if spending  shares  were  the  driving  force and 
government  spending  primarily affected  the relative price of nontraded 
goods  in terms of tradeables,  we should  not expect real exchange rates in 
manufacturing  to show  substantial  changes.  Yet the  series  constructed 
by Morgan Guaranty that is built of relative prices in nonfood  manufac- 
tures does show  substantial  changes  over time. 
The example  of Spain in Figure 1 is a case in point.  Is the progressive 
real appreciation  of Spain since 1984 really evidence  of a spending  boom 
or rather of an exchange  rate policy that has become firmer but has failed 
to curb inflation  with  substantial  success? 
Figure  1 SPAIN;  THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  (INDEX  1980-1982  = 100) 
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The second  question  concerns  the use of the nominal  spending  share in 
Froot and Rogoff's  empirical work.  It is well  known  from the literature 
on productivity  and relative prices that an increase in the productivity  of 
manufacturing  will raise the real price of home  goods.  Is such an effect 
enough  to affect the nominal  spending  share? And if so, is the spending 
share effect on real exchange  rates simply  a disguised  avenue  by which 
productivity  is the driving force? 
Table 1 reports for Germany and Italy regressions  that show  a signifi- 
cant impact  of manufacturing  productivity  on  the  nominal government 
spending  share.  There is in fact a significant impact, and it would  there- 
fore be worth  asking  whether  government  spending  is, in fact, the real 
driving  force.  The first step  to do so would  be to use  the real spending 
share in the empirical work. 
Figure 2 shows  the case of Germany and Italy, focusing  on the bilateral 
relationship.  The line G/G*  measures  Germany's real government  spend- 
ing share in GDP relative to that of Italy (the ratio is multiplied  by 100). 
The line  labeled  "Real Ex" measures  the relative consumer  price levels 
measured  in a common  currency. The figure does not lend much support 
to the Froot-Rogoff  hypothesis.  It comes as no surprise that a regression 
of the relative price level  on relative real spending  shares (not reported 
here)  fails  to lend  support  to the  hypothesis  of a positive  relationship 
claimed by Froot and Rogoff. 
If real government  spending  is not the single dominant determinant of 
real  exchange  rates,  what  other  plausible  factors  are  missing?  The 
Balassa-Samuelson  view  holds  that productivity  ought  to play a domi- 
nant view  at least  in a trend sense.  Hsieh  (1982) offers evidence  of this 
effect,  and Froot and  Rogoff give  some  weight  to this factor. The other 
important  influence  is  plain-vanilla  stickiness.  Dornbusch  and  Fischer 
(1991) review experiences  with disinflation programs. The evidence  lends 
strong support  to stickiness  of inflation as a key obstacle to disinflation. 
This fact also explains why overvaluation  is an attractive means for initiat- 
Table  1  NOMINAL  SPENDING  SHARES  AND PRODUCTIVITY: 
log x = a +  3 log y 
Country  a  P  p  R2 
Italy  2.17  0.13  0.74  0.80 
(11.9)  (3.0) 
Germany  1.49  0.32  0.74  0.94 
(6.2)  (5.7) 
Note: x denotes  the share  of nominal  government  spending  in GDP and y the level  of productivity  in 
manufacturing.  The  regression  was  run  with  annual  data  for  the  period  1960-1989.  t-statistics  are 
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ing disinflation programs. Spain or Italy have done exactly that, using 
firm exchange rate policies to try and force down inflation. 
4. End Game 
A particularly  provocative aspect of the Froot-Rogoff paper deals with 
the end game aspect of the convergence to a common currency.  They 
argue: 
The  basic  problem  is that once the date  of a currency  union  is fixed, national 
central  banks  face  a known,  finite  horizon  at which  they  will be  legislated  out of 
existence.  Consequently,  their  interest  in maintaining  a long  term  antiinflation- 
ary  reputation  may  wane  as monetary  union  approaches. 
One must doubt the common sense of the theory.  Italy's  Central  Bank 
is desperately trying to reduce inflation. It is very doubtful that it would 
be favorably  viewed by posterity  if it allowed itself a last frivolous  fling of 
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terminal devaluation. The authors note specifically that the last days 
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The idea of reducing  real wages  by "one last devaluation"  is attractive 
if overvaluation  is the difficulty  now.  Then entering  a firm arrangement 
with a once-and-for-all  depreciation  solves  the real wage  problem just at 
the time where  yet another round is no longer possible  so that credibility 
issues  do  not  lie ahead.  Of course,  this theory  is only  plausible  only  if 
nominal rigidities  are the  problem.  Throughout  the  paper  there is little 
room for such rigidities and, accordingly, in the perspective  of the Froot- 
Rogoff line of argument,  it seems  ad hoc to introduce them at this stage. 
Also in respect  to the real value of public debt there is some question. 
Monetary union  surely does  not require convergence  of either deficits or 
debt  ratios.  The  only  reason  the  transition  to a monetary  union  raises 
special issues  is that it creates a "natural" time to effect a levy in one form 
or another. But, unlike with  the real wage  problem, there is no reason to 
wait to the end  to accomplish  a debt reduction.  In principle the govern- 
ment can do so at any time by a write-off or a special tax. 
Indeed,  devaluation  may be a relatively poor or costly way  of accom- 
plishing  debt reduction,  more so the shorter the maturity of the debt and 
the more it is denominated  in foreign currency. Keynes  (1923) sorted out 
the relative merits of devaluation  and a levy. His conclusion  ran firmly in 
favor of a levy, which  can be tailor-made to suit the political and financial 
purposes  the government  has in mind. 
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stand the transition  of the European Monetary System  (EMS) to a single 
currency  of  Europe.  The  paper  first  examines  to  what  extent  macro- 
economic  variables  have  been  converging  and  how  the  real exchange 
rates have been changing  across the EMS member countries since the start 
of  the  EMS in  1979.  Then  Froot and  Rogoff  evaluate  three  alternative 
explanations  of  the  movement  of real exchange  rates and  examine  the 
credibility problem of monetary authorities in the transition to a common 
European  currency.  Since  the  scope  of  these  issues  is  so  large,  in  the 
following,  I focus on their explanation  of real exchange  rate movements. 
Concerning  the real exchange  rate, the main observation  of Froot and 
Rogoff  is  that,  although  inflation  rates  of  the  EMS member  countries 
have been converging  in the 1980s, there are still some differences in the 
inflation  rates, and thus  the price levels  of nontraded  goods  are diverg- 
ing across the member countries.  Because there has been no realignment 
of nominal  exchange  rates  since  1987, the  differences  in inflation  rates 
have  accumulated  into  the  divergence  of  the  price  levels,  leading  to 
considerable  movements  in real exchange  rates.  Germany, the  Nether- 
lands,  Belgium,  and  Luxembourg  have  had  small  movements  in  real 
exchange  rates since the mid-1980s.  France, Denmark,  and Ireland have 
succeeded  in pulling  down  their inflation  rates to the level  of the  Ger- 
man inflation  rate, and  thus  have  had only  small appreciations  of their 
real exchange  rates against  Germany  in the late 1980s. Italy, the United 
Kingdom,  and  Spain  have  brought  their inflation  rates down  consider- 
ably in the 1980s, but they still exceed the German inflation rate by about 
3 to 4%. As a result their real exchange  rates have appreciated consider- 
ably in the late 1980s. Of these  three groups,  the last group provides  the 
main question  of this  paper; why  have  there been  such large apprecia- 
tions  of  real exchange  rates  in  Italy, the  United  Kingdom,  and  Spain, 
particularly Italy? 
To answer  this  question,  Froot and  Rogoff examine  three alternative 
explanations  of the real exchange  rate: differences in government  spend- 
ing,  differences  in  productivity  growth,  and  imperfectly  credible  de- 
mand policy. Of these  three explanations,  I am going  to discuss  the first 
two  in the following.  The first approach  is to explain the real exchange 
rates by the different  patterns  of government  expenditure  across coun- 
tries,  using  a competitive  real growth  model  of a small open  economy 
with  exogenous  output  of traded goods  and nontraded  goods.  The key 
assumption  is that government  consumption  is concentrated  in the pur- 
chase  of the nontraded  good.  An increase  in government  consumption 
increases  the  relative  price of the  nontraded  good  to the  traded  good. 
Thus,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  in  the  country  with  a  high 
growth  rate of government  consumption  (for example,  Italy). Using  the 324 *  KIYOTAKI 
log utility function  as assumed  in the regression,  the model in the appen- 
dix (8-10)  can be simplified  as follows: The agent chooses  the path of the 
traded good  consumption  CTt and the net foreign  asset  Wt to maximize 
the discounted  utility: 
U =  E  t [a ln(YNt-Gt) +  (1-a)  ln(CTt)]  (1) 
t=O 
subject to the budget  constraint: 
Wt+1  =  r[Wt +  YTt  -  CTt],  (2) 
taking  the  path  of  the  output  of  traded  and  nontraded  goods,  YTt,YNt, 
government  consumption  Gt, and the gross real interest rate, r, and the 
initial asset  W0, as given.  The first-order conditions  are 
CTt+/Ct  =  pr  (3) 
Pt =  aCTt/[(1-ao)(YNt-Gt)],  (4) 
where  Pt is the relative price of the nontraded  good  to the traded good. 
The real exchange  rate of the home  country Rt is defined  as the relative 
price of the home  consumption  goods  basket to the foreign consumption 
goods basket: Rt  = (PT  P  PTt  )(PPtt  -0) = (P/P*t),  using the normalization PTt 
= Pt  =  1, where  the asterisk indicates  the foreign value.  Thus the log of 
the real exchange  rates rt (which  is different from the real interest rate r) 
is given  as 
rt =  constant  -  a ln(YNt-Gt) +  a ln(YNt-G).  (5) 
The main  findings  of Froot and  Rogoff's  empirical study  of the gov- 
ernment  model  are  (1) a 1% increase  in  the  ratio of  government  con- 
sumption  to GNP at home  increases  the real exchange  rate by about 2% 
during  the  periods  under  the  EMS and  the  Bretton Woods  system;  (2) 
about  a  quarter  of  the  appreciation  of  the  Italian  real  exchange  rate 
against  the  German  Mark between  1979 and  1990 can be explained  by 
the relative increase  in the consumption  of the Italian government;  and 
(3) the government  expenditure  model  does  not explain the movement 
of  the  real exchange  rate during  the  period  of  flexible  exchange  rates 
from  1973 to  1979.  It is  notable  that  the  regression  results  under  the 
EMS and  the  Bretton  Woods  system  are  consistent  with  the  govern- 
ment  model.  But I am  also  interested  in  the  residuals  of  what  is  ex- 
plained  by  their  model,  particularly in  the  failure of  the  model  under Comment 325 
the  flexible  exchange  rates,  because  it suggests  how  the  real exchange 
rate  depends  on  the  exchange  rate  system.  I  suspect  that  the  poor 
performance  of  the  model  under  the  flexible  exchange  rates  may  be 
related  to  a possible  failure  of  the  law  of  one  price  for traded  goods. 
Thus,  it would  be  interesting  to  decompose  the  movement  of the  real 
exchange  rate into  the  change  in the  relative price of nontraded  goods 
to traded goods  in each  country  and the change  of the relative price of 
traded  goods  between  two  countries.  Then  it may become  possible  to 
examine  how  the  relative  prices  of  nontraded  goods  to  the  traded 
goods  depend  on government  consumption  and to what extent the law 
of one price does  not hold  for traded goods. 
The second  approach  to the study  of real exchange  rates extends  the 
first approach  by  introducing  productivity  growth  and  labor mobility 
across the traded good  and nontraded  good  sectors.  The idea is that, if 
the growth  rate of productivity  of the traded good  sector is higher than 
the nontraded  good  sector in the home  country, then  the relative price 
of  the  nontraded  good  to  the  traded  good  will  increase  and  the  real 
exchange  rate  of  the  home  country  will  appreciate.  The  competitive 
equilibrium  of  the  small  open  economy  in  the  model  of  Froot  and 
Rogoff corresponds  to the solution  of the following  problem.  The agent 
chooses  the  path  of  labor and  output  of  traded  and  nontraded  goods 
(LTt,LNt  YTt  YNt),  the consumption of traded goods CTt, and the net for- 
eign  asset  Wt to maximize  the discounted  utility in Equation (1); subject 
to the budget  constraint  [Equation (2)] the production  functions 
YTt  =  ATtL  YNt =  ANtL,  (6) 
and  the  labor constraint,  LTt +  LNt =  L, taking  total labor L, the  gross 
interest  rate,  r, and  the  initial  asset  Wo, as  given.  ATt and  ANt  are the 
indices  of productivity  in the traded good  and nontraded  good  sectors. 
The first order conditions  are Equations  (3,4) and 
TATtLTt  TYT/LTt(7) 
Pt:  A  dLN-1  ONYNt/LN  ON  NtLNt  NWNt 
Froot and Rogoff use these conditions  to derive the relationship  [Equa- 
tion (4) in Froot-Rogoff] 
rt- =  a  +  3(t-  )  +  1,(z,  -  zt)  +  62(Zt  -  Zt)  +  et  (8) 
where gt is the ratio of the government  consumption  to GNP, and zt and Zt 
are the indices  of productivity  in the  traded good  sector and the entire 326 *  DISCUSSION 
economy.  Here,  however,  I have  certain  difficulties  in  following  their 
argument.  First, they use labor productivity  as the index of productivity 
due  to  Hicksian  neutrality.  But the  measures  of labor productivity  are 
endogenous  variables and are not proportional to the productivity indices 
in the production  function (ANt,ANt),  unless employment  is constant. Also, 
if labor productivity  is used  in Equation (8), there is no room for govern- 
ment  consumption,  because  the relative price of the nontraded  good  to 
the traded good is proportional to the ratio of the labor productivity of the 
traded good  sector to the nontraded  good sector by Equation (7). Second, 
Froot and Rogoff argue that the labor will not move across sectors due to 
unanticipated  permanent  productivity  shocks in both sectors.  But this is 
true only if the ratio of the government  consumption  to the output of the 
nontraded  good  (G/YNt) is kept constant,  which is difficult to imagine for 
the case of unanticipated  shocks.  Also,  the model under perfect foresight 
does  not  seem  to  be  suitable  for analyzing  the  recurrent productivity 
shocks.  At  this  point,  I do  not  know  how  far the  results  of Froot and 
Rogoff are affected if a more sophisticated  analysis of productivity shocks 
is made.  I think,  however,  that the  model  of productivity  growth  and 
fluctuations  deserves  more careful analysis before rejecting it and that it 
would  be desirable  to incorporate  uncertainty  about future productivity 
and government  consumption  into the model  more explicitly. 
One of the reasons  why  Froot and Rogoff chose  to examine  the three 
different models  including  the real growth model rather than one model 
is that we have not yet developed  a framework of the monetary economy 
that most macro economists  are happy  to use for analyzing  the exchange 
rate system  and  monetary  policy.  It may  be  difficult for economists  to 
develop  a general  framework  of the monetary  economy,  and it might be 
more difficult  for the  people  to achieve  a single  currency of Europe.  A 
prominent  British economist  recently predicted  that the single  currency 
of  Europe  could  not  be  achieved  by  the  year  2000.  Europe  would  be 
more serious  about a single  currency only  then because  the fundamen- 
tals will  be more  favorable  in  ten years.  I hope  that we  will be able to 
provide  a better  theoretical  base  for studying  monetary  policy  under  a 
common  currency by then. 
Discussion 
Stanley Fischer asked why  the reputation of Italy's central bank ceases to 
be  important  once  a  single  currency  is  formed.  After  all,  the  Italian 
government  will still want to borrow money. Robert Barro also expressed 
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surprise  that the  model  did not contain  some  penalty  or reward to the 
individual  central bankers conditional  on the state in which  they deliver 
their economies  on the date of union.  Alessandra  Casella noted  that the 
Italian  Central  Bank  is  concerned  with  what  reputation  it  will  have 
within  the union.  Rogoff responded  by saying that while these issues  do 
speak  to continuity  across  regimes,  there  still exists  some  discontinui- 
ties.  For instance,  at the  time  of  union  one  can redenominate  all con- 
tracts in a way  that cannot be done  at other times. 
Rudi Dornbusch  asked  why  a central banker would  not just write-off 
the debt today instead  of suffering the large differential due to the antici- 
pation of a write-off  on the last day. Rogoff suggested  that it is easier to 
deflate  debt  through  inflation  rather  than  through  a  write-off.  Dorn- 
busch,  citing Keynes,  stated that a special tax is preferable to inflation; a 
devaluation  causes  all sorts  of problems  for the banking  system.  Barro 
countered  that there must be some  inhibitions  to taxing debt, otherwise 
people  would  not  hold  the  debt.  Dornbusch  said that France does  tax 
debt, and that is why  they have a premium. 
Larry Ball offered that an obvious  drawback to monetary union is that 
different governments  give up the ability to independently  stabilize their 
economies  given  different  macro  shocks.  Rogoff  reasoned,  however, 
that many  of the important  shocks  may not be cross-border shocks  but 
shocks  that affect different industries  similarly across countries. 
Alessandra  Casella asked  whether  the process  envisioned  was an im- 
mediate jump to one common  currency or whether  the process would be 
smoother.  This  raises  the  problem  of  the  perceived  substitutability  of 
currencies,  and the whole  issue  becomes  more difficult. A hard ECU has 
been  proposed,  and  she  asked  what  Rogoff  thought.  He  replied  that 
various  ideas  are proposed  continuously,  and  that is why  he  and  Ken 
Froot decided  not  to pursue  that issue.  He  suggested  that a hard ECU 
may mitigate some  of the problems  that he and Froot suggest  are issues. 